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In systems with a very dynamic process like Industry 4.0, contexts of all participating
entities often change and a lot of data exchange happens with external organizations such
as suppliers or producers which brings concern about unauthorized data access. This
creates the need for access control systems able to handle such a combination of a highly
dynamic system and the arising concern about the security of data. In many situations
the decision for access control depends on the context information of the requester. One
concept to support the systematic development of secure systems for these dynamic
environments is the context meta-model. It is a model-driven security approach which
applies the concepts of model-driven software development to the eld of software security
with the help of context-based access policies. Another problem of dynamic system is
that the manual development of access policies can be time consuming and expensive.
Approaches using automated policy generation have shown to reduce this eort. In this
master thesis we introduce a concept which combines the context based model-driven
security with automated policy generation and evaluate if it is a suitable option for the
creation of access control systems and if it can reduce the eort in policy generation. The
approach makes use of usage and misusage diagrams which are on a high architectural
abstraction level to derive and combine access policies for data elements which are located
on a lower abstraction level. The approach was evaluated using four case studies and it
was shown that it is an accurate method for creating policies and an eort reduction can




In Systemen mit sehr dynamischen Prozessen wie in der Industrie 4.0 ändern sich häug
die Kontexte aller beteiligten Teilnehmer und es ndet ein großer Datenaustausch mit
externen Organisationen wie Lieferanten oder Herstellern statt, was Bedenken hinsichtlich
nicht autorisierter Datenzugrie hervorruft. Dies schat die Notwendigkeit für Zugangs-
kontrollsysteme, die diese Kombination aus hochdynamischem System mit gleichzeitiger
Sicherheit der Daten bewältigen können. In vielen Situationen hängt die Entscheidung für
die Zugriskontrolle von den Kontextinformationen des Anforderers ab. Ein Konzept zur
Unterstützung der systematischen Entwicklung sicherer Systeme für diese dynamischen
Umgebungen ist das Kontext-Metamodell. Es handelt sich um einen modellgetriebenen
Sicherheitsansatz, bei dem die Konzepte der modellgetriebenen Softwareentwicklung
mithilfe kontextbasierter Zugrisrichtlinien auf den Bereich der Software-Sicherheit ange-
wendet werden. Ein weiteres Problem der dynamischen Systeme besteht darin, dass die
manuelle Entwicklung von Zugrisrichtlinien zeitaufwändig und teuer sein kann. Ansätze
mit automatisierter Richtlinienerstellung haben gezeigt, dass sich dadurch der Aufwand
verringeren lässt. In dieser Masterarbeit stellen wir ein Konzept vor, das die kontextbasierte
modellgetriebene Sicherheit mit der automatisierten Richtlinienerstellung kombiniert und
bewertet, ob dies eine geeignete Option für die Erstellung von Zugrisrichtlinien ist und
ob es den Aufwand bei der Richtlinienerstellung verringern kann. Der Ansatz verwendet
Usage- und Misusage-Diagramme, die sich auf einer hohen Architekturabstraktionsebene
benden, um Zugrisrichtlinien für Datenelemente abzuleiten und zu kombinieren, die
sich auf einer niedrigeren Abstraktionsebene benden. Der Ansatz wurde anhand von
vier Fallstudien bewertet und es wurde gezeigt, dass es sich um eine genaue Methode zur
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The ongoing automation of traditional manufacturing processes with the help of smart
technology is known as the fourth industrial revolution, or Industry 4.0 [13]. In the global
production of goods, far reaching digital networks and the fundamental restructuring of
production can lead to improved product and service delivery, a boost in overall productiv-
ity, reduced labor cost and energy consumption, resulting in more cost-ecient products
[6]. Massive networking leads to a large amount of data exchange which also occurs with
outside organizations such as suppliers or producers, bringing concern about unauthorized
access to each other’s data [37]. "The protection objectives here are availability, integrity,
condentiality and legally compliant use (e.g. privacy) of the resources or data" [13]. This
creates the need for access control systems able to handle this combination of a highly
complex and dynamic system and the arising concern about the security of data.
A concept created to support the systematic development of secure systems is model-
driven security [34]. It applies the concepts of model-driven software development to the
eld of software security. Compared to manual assessment with inspections, which are
time consuming and error-prone, the automation of techniques during the realization of
secure software systems could guide security analysts towards a more complete inspection
of their software design [43].
One approach combining model-driven security with access control is proposed by Bolz
et al. [5]. Their approach introduces a context meta-model, which allows the representation
of context-based condentiality properties for a dataow analysis on the architectural
level.
The problem that manual development and maintenance of access policies for these
highly dynamic systems is time consuming and expensive [18][19] still remains. Automatic
generation of access policies can reduce this eort [46][10], while simultaneously allowing
the modeling of more dynamic and contextual systems [44].
In their paper, Fernandez and Hawkins [15] propose the use of use cases as a convenient
way of creating access control policies. According to them this has multiple benets.
Firstly, it does not violate the principle of dening authorization at the highest possible
level, at which their semantics are still explicit [17]. Secondly, use cases are needed anyway
during the development of new systems and for the creation of new architectures during
the restructuring of legacy systems. They assume that the security administration of such
a system should be much easier compared to current systems.
In this thesis we want to combine the concept of utilizing usage descriptions of system
for the denition of access policies with the concept of automated policy generation in
order to derive context-based access policies from usage and misusage diagrams.
1
1 Introduction
1.2 Contribution of the Thesis
In this master thesis we introduce a concept which combines the context based model-
driven security with automated policy generation. The approach uses usage and misusage
diagrams which are on a high architectural abstraction to derive and combine access
policies for data elements which are located on a lower abstraction level. Since multiple
use cases aect the same data elements with dierent policies, we also introduce a concept
with which the derivied policies on the data element level can be combined and reduced.
With this concept, we try to minimize the number of policies while keeping the system
policy the same. The derived policies can also contradict each other, either through an
error in the conguration or unplanned interaction in the design, which can be checked
and validated with the introduced approach.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The following briey describes the structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, the running
example is introduced which is set in the context of this thesis and will be used in later
chapters to illustrate how certain concepts work. Chapter 3 describes the foundation of
the approach which is needed for the rest of this thesis. In Chapter 4, the state of the art
of the used concepts is presented. It summarizes them and describes their relevance while
also showing how they dier to our work. Chapter 5 and 6 describe how the automated
derivation and combination of policies works and how the dierent parts of the solution
are designed. In Chapter 7, the architecture and implementation of the created software
is explained. In Chapter 8, the thesis is evaluated using dierent case studies and their
results. Finally, in Chapter 11, the master thesis is summarized and an outlook regarding
future work is given.
2
2 Running Example
In this section, a running example is described. It introduces an example environment
which is going to be used throughout this paper to illustrate the concepts of the thesis,
to show how it can be modelled with the tools used and to describe how the designed
approach is going to work. The running example describes a company which produces













Figure 2.1: Running example illustration
The company’s factory site has one main building, which is split into two areas: the oce
and the assembly, where the machines producing the goods are located. The warehouse
is located in a second, smaller building. Workers inside the assembly are able to check
the status of all machines, schedule new tasks or abort running operations. An employee
3
2 Running Example
inside the warehouse should be able to check the status of all machines and their scheduled
tasks, so he is able to prepare the neccessary parts for the upcoming tasks and free space
for the incoming produced goods. Workers can have shifts assigned to them in which they
work. Workers can change possible shifts themselves in advance up to a certain date, but
only the manager or the team leader can change shifts for other employees. The company
hired an external contractor to maintain their machines and x them in case of failure. The
technician employed by the contractor should not be able to access the machines of the
company during normal operation. However, in case a failure should arise, the technician
should be able to access the machine remotely and run dierent diagnostics on it, so he
is able to prepare his equipment before visiting the company or in best case x the issue
from his desk. If the technician needs to x the problem on-site, he needs to have access
to the factory site. Here, only the manager or the team leader should have the rights to
grant this access. The described use cases are listed in table 2.1.
ID Use case description Actor
1
The workers in the assembly should have
full access to the machines
Worker
2
The workers in the warehouse should be able to
see the current and the scheduled tasks
Worker
3
The workers in the oce should be able to
see the current and the scheduled tasks
Worker
4
The start of a new task should only be allowed
if the person is in the assembly
All
5
An employee should be able to adjust his
upcoming shifts up to a certain date
All
6
Only employees with a leading role should be
able to adjust or assign shifts to employees
Manager, Team Leader
7
Only the manager should have access
to the nancial data of the company
Manager
8
The external technician should




In case of an error the technician
should have access to the diagnostic function
Technician
10
The technician should never be able
to start or stop tasks on the machine
Technician
11
The external worker needs to be granted
temporary access to the factory site
Manager, Team Leader
Table 2.1: Textual description of allowed and forbidden usage of the example system
In the use case descriptions each actor has dierent contexts for which they should
be allowed to execute the described behaviour or, for the negative case, should denied.
A context for a worker is, for example, the role in the company, the currently assigned
4
shift, the position or location inside the company site, the type of task and if a remote
or on-site access is needed. With our approach, the contexts which are assigned to the
use cases descriptions should be derived to the data element they aect. Each task in the
use case can aect multiple data elements. The derived access policies are specied with
contexts from the usage diagram. Since a data element can be aected by multiple use
cases and multiple allowed and forbidden context sets, the derived policies are combined




This chapter describes the foundation of the thesis. A context based approach for access
control is used which is based on Data-Driven Software Architecture. They use the
Palladio Component Model as a modeling framework which is a model-driven software
development approach. Additionally, a brief overview of access control strategies is given.
3.1 Model-Driven Soware Development
Model-Based Software Development (MBSD) is an approach for which models are used as
secondary artifacts for documentation and communication purposes. This use of models
has several disadvantages [41]. Changes in the code have to be transferred to the model
manually or the model and the code become inconsistent. Depending on the degree of the
model’s accuracy, these adaptions can be complex and time-consuming tasks.
Model-Driven Software Development (MDSD) removes these disadvantages by using
models as primary artifacts, which means that they are treated equally to the code. By
nding domain-specic abstractions and making them accessible through formal modeling,
they have great potential for automatic code generation. This can lead to an increase in
the productivity of the software developing process and in the quality and maintainability
of the software system. To describe the rules on which these models are built, models of
these models are needed: the so-called meta-models[41].
3.2 Palladio Component Model
Palladio is a tool-supported simulator for software architecture. It can be used for the
prediction of several quality properties of software. It was initially developed by the Karl-
sruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), the FZI Research Center for Information Technology
and the University of Paderborn. The Palladio Component Model (PCM) is a detailed
meta-model for component-based software architecture which is based on the Eclipse
Modeling Framework (EMF) [3].
Figure 3.1 shows a PCM instance with the dierent models contained in the PCM and
the roles which are responsible for them. In the following sections, the dierent parts of
the PCM are briey explained.
3.2.1 Roles
In model-driven software development and in Palladio various roles work on dierent
parts of the architecture where they contribute their specic knowledge.
7
3 Foundation
Figure 3.1: Palladio component model [3, Fig. 1]
• The architecture and the relationship between the individual components are de-
signed by the Software Architect. He is responsible for passing on further instructions
to the other roles. At the same time, he is responsible for the system model that
denes the composition of the components characterized.
• Knowledge of how the user interacts with the system and which parameters are used
in the control ow come from the Domain Expert. The modeling of this information
is done in the usage model.
• The Component Developer is responsible for implementing and specifying the individ-
ual components. He models these in the repository model. It contains the individual
components and interfaces.
• The Software Distribution Expert composes the system environment for the software.
This is done in the execution environment model. Also, the software distribution
expert instructs resources to the components. This is modeled in the allocation
model.
The models that are developed and maintained by the various roles together form a
Palladio model instance.
3.2.2 Models
The individual roles are responsible for certain sub-models which, as a whole, make up
the complete architecture description. In the following, the ve sub-models in PCM are
described in more detail. For our approach, the rst three are relevant, but the case studies
used in the evaluation have a complete PCM model with all ve parts.
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3.2 Palladio Component Model
3.2.2.1 Repository model
The repository model (Fig. 3.2) contains data types, interfaces and components. A com-
ponent can oer its functionality to the outside via an interface. This is modeled with
a ProvidedRole. It can also request a specic interface must be provided to it in order to
use the functionality of other components. This will be modeled with a RequiredRole.
Interfaces contain a collection of signatures, which represent an operation.
Figure 3.2: Repository model [3, Fig. 3]
With the help of a Service Eect Specication (SEFF ) the behaviour within and between
the components can be described (Fig. 3.3). A SEFF adds a behaviour description to a
signature in the component. The behaviour can be modeled with an InternalCallAction
and an ExternalCallAction. An InternalCallAction represents internal behaviour within the
component. An ExternalCallAction calls an operation in another component. Branches in
the behaviour can be modeled with a BranchAction. Either a probability or a condition
can be specied which decides which branch is taken. Using a UsageVariable, a parameter
assignment for the call can be specied. In addition, the SEFF resource requirements can
be specied in regards to certain resources, such as CPU. The resource requirements are
specied as abstract work packages. In a concrete execution environment, in which the
resources are specied, the time values can be derived from the abstract work packages.
With this behaviour specied in the SEFF, the model can be analyzed.
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Figure 3.3: Service Eect Specication [3, Fig. 6]
3.2.2.2 Systemmodel
Figure 3.4: Composed structure in system model [3, Fig. 12]
The system model (Fig. 3.4) represents the software system that consists of a compo-
sition of the components dened in the repository model. Instances of components are
represented in the system model with AssemblyContext. These can be connected with an
AssemblyConnector. The RequiredRole of a component is linked to the ProvidedRole of a
component. The system model must also provide at least one external interface so it is
possible to interact with the system.
3.2.2.3 Usagemodel
The usage model describes the interaction of the user or external systems with the system
(Fig. 3.5). With aUsageScenario the behaviour of a user can be specied. For aUsageScenario
a workload can be set, which can be either an open or closed workload. A OpenWorkload
models an innite stream of users which arrive in specied time intervals (ArrivalTime) at
the system and execute the scenario. A ClosedWorkload models a xed number of users
(Population) which execute the scenario, wait a specied amount of time (ThinkTime), and
then execute it again. A scenario can call the operations which are provided by the system
10
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via interfaces with an EntryLevelSystemCall. Therefore, the parameter assignments can
also be specied using a UsageVariable.
Figure 3.5: Usage model [3, Fig. 17]
3.2.2.4 Execution environment model
The execution environment model describes the used hardware and the network of the
modeled software system. The elements ResourceContainer and LinkingResourceContainer
are used. The ResourceContainer is a hardware resource, a LinkingResource is a channel
between two ResourceContainer. For a ResourceContainer, dierent hardware resources
can be specied. A CPU can be used as a processor, an HDD can be used as a hard disk
and a Delay can model the delay between two actions.
3.2.2.5 Component-Allocation-Model
The allocation model describes how the individual component instances are distributed on
the hardware described in the execution environment model. For this an AllocationContext
is used.
3.2.3 Quality attributes
The Palladio bench can determine quality attributes for a system. They will be calculated
from the components, their connections and the execution environment.
• Performance: Performance is one of the most important quality criteria of a system
in regards to the timing constraints of the system. This applies to both time-critical
and less critical systems. Performance includes the timing and resource usage of a
system. This is measured using three metrics. The response time is the time between
a request to a system and the received response. The throughput describes the
number of requests processed per unit of time. The utilization relates to the active
use of a resource and indicates the percentage it works per unit of time.
• Reliability: A system that oers a service as expected and with no side eects is called
reliable. Any deviation from expected behaviour is considered an error. The overall
reliability of a system is therefore expressed as the probability that the system is
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working properly. Dierent errors can occur, for example software errors, hardware
errors or network errors.
• Cost: Having many requirements usually leads to high costs. Therefore, between cost
and performance or reliability must be weighed. Palladio enables the annotation of
the cost of components and resources to estimate total costs and to make a trade-o
with the quality attributes.
• Maintainability: Often during the development of software, there is more then one
viable design possible. Palladio allows the calculation of the maintenance of the
dierent alternatives on the system level by assigning maintenance eorts per design
alternative and maintenance costs per design alternative.
While these four quality attributes are the main focus in normal software development,
for the development of secure systems an additional attribute is added with the security
aspect. There has been some development to bring extensions to the Palladio framework to
enable it to perform analysis of this quality aspect of the system [5][40]. The contribution
of our thesis will be in this area.
3.3 Data-Driven Soware Architecture
Data-Driven Palladio is an extension of the PCM which integrates the concept of dataow.
This extension together with an analysis process for condentiality create the development
process of Data-Driven Software Architectures (DDSA) [40]. The Data-Driven Extension
introduces data and data processing operators as rst-class entities and Data-Driven Palla-
dio supplies the meta-model, which denes how data is represented and which operations
are to be performed on them. These data elements can have sets of characteristics which
represent their abstract meta-data [39]. Access right mismatches are detected with the
condentiality analysis by comparing access rights assigned to data with roles assigned
to the processing operations on this data. The fact that the access rights can be changed
during the data processing steps is considered in this analysis. The condentiality analysis
is realized as a Prolog program and uses a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) strategy to
detect access right mismatches. The context meta-model introduced in section 3.6 is based
on this modeling approach and extends it for the use of context-dependent access control
policies [40].
3.4 Model-Driven Security
Firstly, software security is dened. The denition used in this thesis is derived from “A
Reference Model of Information Assurance Security” [9] and splits software security in
three parts:
• Condentiality: "A system should ensure that only authorised users access informa-
tion"
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• Integrity: "A system should ensure completeness, accuracy and absence of unautho-
rised modications in all its components"
• Availability: "A system should ensure that all the system’s components are available
and operational when they are required by authorised users"
Since our approach wishes to derive access control policies, we mainly focus on Con-
dentiality. A denition of how access control systems try to ensure Condentiality is
given in section 3.5.
Model-driven security (MDS) applies the model-driven approaches and the concepts
of model-driven software development to security in order to solve software security
problems. The security of software depends on a wide variety of factors and details. These
vary from high-level aspects such as the design of policies to low-level aspects like avoiding
insecure software patterns or avoiding buer overows. Many of these security concepts,
goals or techniques can be described formally and validated or veried [1].
Since not each software developer has deep knowledge and comprehension of security
related topics [22], model-driven approaches can help with the development of secure
systems in multiple ways. Security-specic knowledge can be built into a part of the
meta-model and the developers only have to use it. The automatic generation of source
code can help prevent low-level security issues by preventing errors on the implementation
level. Verifying models which were annotated by the role responsible for security could
reveal issues in the system a developer of a single component might not be aware of.
3.5 Access Control Strategies
Access control mechanisms ensure the following properties of the system [4]:
(a) access rights to resources are granted only to authorized entities.
(b) access rights to resources are not denied to authorized entities.
There are four common techniques used for access control systems: mandatory access
control (MAC) [26], discretionary access control (DAC) [25], role-based access control
(RBAC) [16] and attributed-based access control (ABAC) [19]. These techniques are briey
dened with a focus on the core concepts. For all of them, several variations have been
published.
3.5.1 Mandatory access control
In access control systems which use mandatory access control [26], labels are are assigned
to resources and users. A label consists of a security level and a category. Security levels
are dened in an ordered fashion, e.g. unrestricted, secret, top-secret. Users can access a
resource if the category of their label matches the one on the resource and their security




3.5.2 Discretionary access control
The discretionary access control [25] grants each user access to his own resources and the
user can grant other users access to his resources. The access granted can vary in dierent
ways from read-only to write, or even if the new users can grant access to the resource
to other users. While this technique takes little managing eort it places the complete
security management in the hands of the individual users.
3.5.3 Role Based Access Control
Role-based access control [16] consists of ve dierent entities: users, roles, permissions,
operations and objects. Users are grouped in roles which can be structured hierarchically.
Permissions are assigned to each role. A permission is an operation like read, write or
delete on a certain object. Access to an object is only granted if the role assigned the user
is authorized to access the object. Users can have multiple roles assigned to them. It is
currently the most used access control strategy [14].
3.5.4 Attribute Based Access Control
Attribute-based access control [19] (also known as policy-based access control or rule-
based access control) grants or denies access to resources based on attributes provided by
the request. Depending on the scenario, everything can be an attribute, e.g. names, roles,
job titles, the time of the request, the nature of the requested access like read or write
or the type of the requested resource. Attribute-based policies are stored in permission
assignment constraints (PACs) and can be expressed positively or negatively. Even though
RBAC is currently the most used access control strategy, ABAC is predicted to be the
future state of the art [14].
3.6 Context Meta Model
TheContextModel was introduced by Boltz et al. in “Context-Based Condentiality Analysis
for Industrial IoT” [5]. It is a model-driven security approach which extends the DDSA.
With this meta model, it is possible to give elements in the PCM model certain contexts.
Contexts serve two purposes: They can represent properties of the element, like a state,
or they can be understood as an access rule if they are dened for data elements. The
ContextModel denes three types of context classes, which are used to represent dierent
properties. The class structure of the ContextModel and these dierent subclasses are
shown in gure 3.8.
• SimpleContext: A SimpleContext represents a xed global value. An example is the
current status of a machine or the assigned shift of an employee. The machine status
in this case would be an unique ContextType, since a machine can only have one
status at a time. The shift context is not unique; it could be possible for an employee
to be assigned a double shift like evening and night shift, or a day shift and on
stand-by the rest of the time.
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Figure 3.7: Examples of HierarchicalContexts
• HierarchicalContext: HierarchicalContext can be used to represent the hierarchical
dependencies of a property. In the running example, this would be applicable to
the location of a worker inside the production plant or the rank of an employee.
These hierarchical contexts are represented in gure 3.7. The location context in this
case is a top-down context, meaning a context further down in the tree structure
could have has more rights since it inherits all the access rights of the higher up
contexts. For example, if a worker inside "Building A" is allowed to access a machine,
it implies that workers from "Assembly" as well as workers from the "Oce" have
these rights. But if workers from "Assembly" are allowed to access the machines, it
doesn’t imply that all workers inside "Building A" have access rights. On the contrary,
workers inside "Oce" don’t have access to the machines, unless explicitly stated in
a dierent policy.
As a notation in the shown graphs, the arrow indicates that the context set is a child
of the other node, e.g. "Assembly" is a child node of "Building A". The inheritance
direction denes if the child inherits from the parent or the other way round.
• RelatedContext: A RelatedContext can be used to refer to a dierent ContextSet which
needs to be fullled in order for this context to be true.
To group dierent contexts of the same type, the ContextType can be used. As an
example, the dierent shifts a worker can have, like day or night shift, are contexts of the
same type. Here it should be ensured that two contexts of the same type are also of the
same context class, otherwise the comparison of contexts of the same type might not work
as expected. This contraint also ensures that the contexts of HierarchicalContext are all of
the same type.
A ContextSet is a collection of ContextAttributes. For example, for the use case 3 of the
running example the context set would be {Worker, Oce, Remote}. The use case 9 could
be described with the context set {Technician, External, Remote, Failure}. The attribute of






























































































































































































3.6 Context Meta Model
These ContextSet can be assigned to SEFFs with a PolicySpecication, which describes
the access policy for this data element. If the ContextSet is part of a ContextSpecication, it




In this chapter similar concepts to that of this thesis are listed. Our approach has three
dierent areas which have an inuence, namely the automatic generation of access control
policies, the model driven development of secure systems and the concept of security
by design. The current state of the art is shown, the similarities and dierences to our
approach described and our contributions presented.
4.1 Automatic Policy Generation
In “On the Impact of Generative Policies on Security Metrics” [45] Verma et al. describe
the impact of generated policies on the security metrics of a system. Since modern systems
tend to gets more dynamic and complex and manual creation of policies becomes more
and more dicult, they introduce concepts to determine if generating security policies is
benecial in improving the security of the system. We use this concept of establishing
equivalence between a generated and a manual system for our evaluation setup in section
8.4.
In “Generative policy model for autonomic management” [44] an approach is presented
with which managed devices are able to generate policies for their own operations. In the
introduced management system an interaction graph contains all the allowed activities for
each device. The policies for each device are then generated according to this interaction
graph. This enables the architectures to achieve some form of self-management. The
authors claim that their approach provides several benets over the state of the art role
based concepts and allows the modeling of more dynamic and contextual systems. Their
paper illustrates the need for the automatic generation of policies in large scale modern
systems. Compared to their approach we do not want to introduce new design artifacts
like the interaction graph but want to use already existing artifacts. Additionally, we do
not want to generate the policies during runtime as done with the managed devices but
instead want to derive the context based access policies for the data elements during the
design phase.
One concept for generating policies is Policy Mining. The survey “A Survey of Role
Mining” [32] categorizes the dierences of various RBAC mining concepts. The basic
concept of role mining is that most organizations concerned with secure systems already
have user-permission assignments dened in some form. This information is then used to
identify new roles in the system. The survey was conducted since in recent years several
role mining techniques have been developed. This fact shows again the need for automatic
policy generation. Since the survey was conducted on RBAC systems we instead focus
on approaches which use ABAC access control systems, as these are predicted to be the
future state of the art [19]. A concept for role mining in ABAC systems is introduced in
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“Mining Attribute-Based Access Control Policies from Logs” [46] and “Mining ABAC Rules
from Sparse Logs” [10]. In gure 4.1 the basic concept of this policy mining concept is
illustrated. In (a) the user-permissions of the current system are shown, in this case they
are present in the form of log entries. (b) shows the system described by the organisational
security policy and (c) the actual implemented ABAC policy. (d) shows the mined policy
created by the ABAC mining algorithm.
Figure 4.1: Basic concept of mining policies [10, Fig.1]
The similarity to our approach is that the usage and misusage diagrams represent a
certain scenario which should be allowed or forbidden which is similar to the information
in the log entries containing allowed or denied user requests. The dierence is that in order
for the log entries to be created the system has to be already implemented and running.
These approaches are therefore more suitable to be used to migrate an existing system. Our
approach uses the information in the usage and misusage diagrams to derive the access
policies during the design phase. This also allows for the possible detection of security
issues in the conguration of the system during this early phase in the development. The
policy mining algorithms use generalization. An algorithm that generalizes well creates
policies which not only t the logged entries but also include non-logged requests for
which a signicant number of similar requests have been authorized. This concept was
excluded from the scope of this thesis since it would have been too time consuming to
develop in the given time frame. Instead it is outlined as future work in chapter 10.
The paper “Access control policy combining: Theory meets practice” [27] introduces a
policy combining language which can express a variety of policy combining algorithms.
This addresses the issue that many policy languages only have xed policy combining
strategies which makes it hard to extend them with possible new rules. In the paper the
concepts of the currently existing policy combining algorithms were also briey explained.
These concepts were used to create the rules we dened for combining and reducing the
derived context sets. We didn’t use an existing policy combining language in our approach.
Although this brings some disadvantages the advantage of our approach is that both the
usage diagram context descriptions and the policy specications are part of the context
meta model. Therefore, we don’t need to use transformations between dierent models
and are not concerned about consistency between them.
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4.2 Model Driven Development of Secure Systems
Our approach will be based on a model driven concept for developing secure systems.
In this section we compare the available concepts and explain why we think the chosen
concept best ts for our approach. In their survey An Extensive Systematic Review on Model-
Driven Development of Secure Systems [34] Nguyen et al. grouped the signicant MDS
approaches. For the purpose of this thesis we focus on approaches which use structured
system descriptions.
SecureUML [29] aims at modeling access control policies for RBAC and then uses
these policies to transform them into a complete access control infrastructure. It extends
UML diagrams with annotations for roles, permissions, users and access control policies.
Although it can be applied to a wide range of scenarios, the fact that it is based on a RBAC
strategy makes it dicult to extend for a context-based condentiality.
UMLSec [21] is an approach for modeling secure software systems applicable to dierent
platforms. It is extending UML with features to model systems and analyze their security.
Its modeling process is use case driven which assigns every use case diagram a goal tree
which can have three states: undetermined, satised or denied. Although the use case
driven nature would suit our approach, UMLSec only supports RBAC access policies.
The SecDFD approach [42] allows to analyze security-centric information ow policies
on the design model. It used a graphical notation similar to Data Flow Diagrams which
has additional security concepts and helps in the early discovery of design aws. Here the
disadvantages are that a possible already existing architecture description of the system
needs to be transferred into the graph notation and that having a single SecDFD graph for
the complete system might be dicult for large architectures.
With the iFlow approach [23] a UML model of an application can used to automatically
generate the code of the app as well as the formal models for it. TheMODELFLOW language
can be used to model systems including their behaviour and security requirements. The
problem with this approach is setting up the complete security domain with transitions
on the granularity level of methods can be dicult.
The context meta-model presented by Boltz et al. in “Context-Based Condentiality
Analysis for Industrial IoT” [5] introduces an approach to model context-based conden-
tiality properties on the architectural level. The context based nature of this approach
adds the possibility to model the dynamic elements of the systems and make is similar to
the concepts of ABAC access control systems.
The problem that all of these approaches have in common is that the manual creation and
maintenance of policies is taking a lot of eort. In our approach we therefore introduce the
possibility to derive policies from usage diagrams with the intention to reduce this eort.
We use the context model for the modeling of the access policies since it allows both the
context specications for the usage and misusage diagrams and the policy specications
for the data elements to be modelled in the same meta model.
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4.3 Security by Design
In their paper “A Scenario-Driven Role Engineering Process for Functional RBAC Roles”
[33] Neumann and Strembeck present a scenario-driven role engineering process for RBAC
roles which uses scenario as the main concept for creating policies. They see a scenario
as a collection of permissions that are applied in a particular order to reach a predened
goal. The subject trying to execute this goal needs to own all permissions that are needed
to complete every step of the particular scenario. Figure 4.2 shows the basic model they
use in their approach. Permissions and constraints are dened in catalogs, tasks and work
proles are created in accordance to these permissions. A scenario is seen a series of tasks,
and the work proles which are equal to a role of a user consist of one or more tasks. From
these denitions, a RBAC-model is derived. One benet they see with their approach is
that changes in functionality of the system can be easily added by adapting the scenario
model from which the new RBAC-model is then derived.
Figure 4.2: Scenario-driven role engineering process [33, Fig.4]
The similarity to this concept is the use of scenario models as the point of denition of
permissions. Also the use of a permission and constrain catalog is similar to our concept
of dening usage and misusage scenarios. Deriving the RBAC-model from the scenarios is
similar to the derivation process we use in our approach. The dierence to their approach
is that they use roles for the denition of the access rights of an entity which is a role-based
approach. By using context attributes we use a concepts which is more similar to the
ABAC technique, since the contexts of an entity can be seen as attributes. The dierence
to a pure ABAC approach is that contexts can also specic the access policies of a data
element. So a context fullls two purposes, while an policy in ABAC is specied based on
the relations of attributes.
Tuma et al. describe in their paper “Automating the Early Detection of Security Design
Flaws” [43] an approach for the automatic detection of security aws during the design
phase of secure systems. Compared to manual assessment with design inspections, which
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are time consuming and error-prone, their paper analyses the potential of automating the
rules performed during an inspection in order to speed up the security analysis. They
suggest that automated techniques during the realization of secure software systems could
guide security analysts towards a more complete inspection of their software design. Our
approach is similar in that by evaluating the derived policies from the usage and misusage
diagrams potential design aws in the software can be found. The dierence is that their
approach tries to nd these security issues by comparing the models to design anti-pattern.
In our approach the found issues are either within the context conguration of the system
which indicates a user error, or the composition of the system leads to contradicting access




The rst part of this thesis derives policies from the use case descriptions to the data
elements. The basic concept is explained in the rst section, illustrating how the dierent
models are used in our approach and describing the fundamental steps of the latter. Each
step is then described in detail in the following sections.
5.1 Concept
Fernandez and Hawkins suggest the utilization of use case descriptions as a way of creating
access right policies [15]. In the PCM the use case descriptions are modeled in the usage
model as operations executed on the system. These system operations manipulate data
elements in the components of the system. The access control of these single data elements
is abstracted in this approach to operations. Operation are provided within the PCM by
SEFFs in the repository model. The advantage of system models is that the domain expert,
who is responsible for it, does not need to know the details of the system composition
or how each component is implemented, only the interaction with the system needs to
be specied. On the other hand, from the modeled information in the usage model it is
not obvious which components and functions are called inside the system. Figure 5.2
illustrates this situation with the use case 1 of the running example. In the usage model,
only the system call to start a new task is called. As a context for this action, the context
set {Worker, Assembly, NightShift} is assigned. In the called system the call is connected to
the MachineController. For each change in the current task the machine updates a central
database in the system modelled as TaskServer. This allows for workers in the oce to
request the status of dierent machines. In this scenario, the derived context policy not
only needs to be applied to the SEFF startTask of the machine, but also to the updateTask
SEFF of the server.
The process of deriving policies can be grouped into three main steps as shown in gure
5.1.
Create policiesFind affected data elements
Find context set 
to derive
Figure 5.1: Basic concept of the derivation process
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The rst step is to determine by what contexts a call to the system is aected. For each
system call, all the aected components and the therein aected SEFFs have to be found.
Lastly, the context of the system call has to be applied to the SEFF as an access policy
specication.
Additionally, the designed approach should be backwards compatible. This means that
it should still be possible to create manual access policy specication on the SEFF level.















Class Diagram : Repository Model
TaskServerMachineController
System : Assembly Model




Start new task 
on a machine
Worker
Figure 5.2: View of the dierent models used in the derivation
26
5.2 Usage Model Context Set
5.2 Usage Model Context Set
The usage model is where the contexts which should be derived are dened. Each En-
tryLevelSystemCall represents a call to the system for which the allowed permissions and
forbidden constraints can be dened in the form of context sets. The ContextSpecication
in the context model allows the context set to either be dened for the complete Scenari-
oBehaviour or a single EntryLevelSystemCall. This allows for dierent options by which
context sets the system call and, therefore, all the aected SEFFs are aected.
• Only the system call is aected: Here, the context sets are dened directly for the
specic system call. Since there is no default dened for the scenario, the context
sets are directly derived to the SEFFs
• Only the usage scenario is aected: In this case, the context is specied for the
complete scenario and, therefore, the default for each system call. Since the system
call does not specify a derivation, only these context sets are applied to the aected
SEFFs
• Both are aected: In this case, multiple methods are possible. The scenario context
could be seen as a default, and the system call overrides this default context. The
scenario context could be seen as the base context, and the system call only species
an extension of this base context. Alternately, both contexts could be seen as two
separate cases which should both be derived.
• No context specied: Since neither the system call has a specic nor the scenario a
default context which should be derived, this is treated as undened context.
5.3 Finding aected Service Eect Specifications
To nd the aected SEFFs, the chain of function calls has to be followed. The start is the
EntryLevelSystemCall in the usage diagram. It denes the called interface and method. In
the AssemblyContext of the system model, the matching OperationProvidedRole has to be
found. This allows the selection of the rst aected component. The corresponding SEFF
can be selected using the method signature. Each SEFF can call other components with a
ExternalSystemCall.
Figure 5.3 shows this in an example. Here, component A is the rst aected component
of the system call. The component itself calls two other components, so if one of its SEFFs
calls an external component, this call could go to either component B or component C.
They are both in the same AssemblyContext as component A. Component C shows the
issues with CompositeComponents. Externally, they appear to be like normal components,
but contain an assembly context themselves; in this case, component D. An external call
for component D does not go to the same assembly, instead the match has to be made









Figure 5.3: System model with nested components
5.4 Creating policies
With the rst two steps from the previous sections two lists are generated. The rst
contains the aected data elements of the user action and the second the context sets
which are currently assigned to the user for this request. With this information, the new
policies for the data elements are created.
There were two design options for how the new policies should be created. Either a new
policy is created for each permutation of the elements in the list, or it is checked if a policy
already exists for the current aected data element, and the new context set is added to
that policy. The rst option has the advantage that it keeps the creation process simple,
but on the other hand more policies are created. The second option keeps the number of
policies small, but makes the creation of them more complex. For example, since multiple
policies could already exist for the aected data element, it must then be decided to which
the new context set is added.
The rst option was chosen. The creation of multiple PolicySpecication makes it easier
for the user to see which policies were created, and by which usage diagram. This simplies
debugging. Additionally, it keeps a clear separation between the manually created policies
and the policies which are derived and created by the algorithm. The second reason for
this option was that it creates a clear separation of concerns between the two parts of this
thesis. In the deriving process, only the policies are derived and no combining of any sort
should occur. The second part then combines the policies in the context model aecting
the same data elements.
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The second part of this thesis focuses on the combination and reduction of the derived
policies. In the rst section the basic concept is explained. The second second explains the
dierent rules dened which can be applied to the context model.
6.1 Rules Combining Concept
During the derivation process it is possible that multiple access policies are derived for the
same SEFF. These can happen in two possible ways: multiple usage diagrams aect the
same system function, or a component is called by multiple other components. If multiple
PolicySpecications exist for the same SEFF, all of the assigned ContextSets grant access to
the data element represented by this SEFF. The same is true for PolicySpecications which
contain multiple context sets. Table 6.1 shows how the resulting access policy is dened
in this case.
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Remote}
Set2 = {Worker, Assembly}
Access Policy: Set1 ∨ Set2
Table 6.1: Example for multiple context sets
The rst context set grants access to workers who request remote access, the second to
workers in the assembly. To be granted access to this object, an employee must fulll at
least one of these conditions. The context set can, therefore, seen as a logical disjunction.
Additionally, a less specic policy grants access to a more specic context set, as long as
all the contexts are included in in. For the example, the context set {Worker, Assembly,
NightShift} would also be granted access, since it is included in Set2. The same is true
for hierarchical contexts. Here, the less specic context set does not have to contain the
exact same context, but must only contain a hierarchical element which passes it on to the
more specic one. For example, the context set {Team Leader, Remote, DayShift} would also
be granted access, since all the contexts are contained ("Team Leader" inherits his access
rights from "Worker", since it is bottom up).
Since the policies specied in the context model are later used by the access control
system to decide if access should be granted or not, the design in our approach is to create
a minimal set of policy specications by combining context sets. The reason for this is that
the combination of policies can be done during the development phase of the system. Not
combining policies can lead to more policies which need to be checked during runtime.
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The table 6.2 shows an example for the combination of rules. Here, Set1 and Set2 do not
need to be saved, since they are already included in the third context set.
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Assembly, Remote}
Set2 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set3 = {Worker}
Access Policy: (Set3)
Table 6.2: Example for combining rules
Since negative contexts from the misusage diagrams are also derived, the priority of the
dierent possible context sets is dened. P (Permit), D (Deny) and IN (Indeterminate) are
the possible values a certain context set request can have for a specifc SEFF. P is the case if
the policy matches the requested context set, D if the requested context set is explicitly
forbidden by a negative context set, and IN if the context set does not match the assigned
context sets. We dene that all undened access policies should be denied, therefore IN
results in a denied request. The priority order we dene is: D > P > IN. This means a
negative context set, derived from a misusage diagram, overrides aa assigned positive
context set. And a positive context set overrides the implicit denil of undened behaviour.
Table 6.3 shows an example for this.
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Remote}
Set2 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set3 = negative, {Technician}
Access Policy: (Set1 ∨ Set2) ∧ ¬ Set3
Table 6.3: Example for multiple context sets with negative context set
The third context set is derived from a misusage diagram, forbidding the "Technician"
access to this SEFF. To be granted access to the object, the user has to fulll either one
of the positive context sets, and he must not fulll the negative context set. Since the
context meta-model does not allow the storage of the negative information of context sets,
this information is only available during the execution of the approach. As the IN state is
dened as "access denied", the information of Set3 does not have to be saved in the nal
context model. This assumption holds true as long as there are no conicting context sets.
Table 6.4 shows this case.
Here, a worker in the oce should not have remote access to this data element. At
the same time, the context set Set1 grants access to workers in the oce. If here the
information of Set2 would simply be omitted, the created context model would grant
access to the contex set {Worker, Oce, Remote}. This would result in an access rights
violation, since the explicit forbidden case is now allowed. For Set3 and Set4, there is no
issue, since after omitting the information of set3, set4 would still have access, and set3




Set1 = {Worker, Oce}
Set2 = negative, {Worker, Oce, Remote}
Set3 = negative, {Technician}
Set4 = {Technician, Remote, Failure}
Access Policy: error
Table 6.4: Example for error case
6.2 Rule Definitions
For this approach, multiple combination rules have been dened. Since the development
process was iterative, rules were implemented consecutively. The next sections give an
overview of the dened rules which are present in the current approach.
6.2.1 Same Context Set
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set2 = {Worker, Assembly}
Access Policy: Set1
Table 6.5: Same context set
This rule is used to combine two context sets which contain the exact same elements.
This rule is also needed as a basis for some of the other rules, which, by being applied,
result in duplicate context sets.
6.2.2 Simpler Context Set
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set2 = {Worker, Assembly, Remote}
Access Policy: Set1
Table 6.6: Simpler context set
This rule combines two contexts, for which one includes the other. This rule does not
consider inheritance of hierarchical contexts.
6.2.3 Parent Child Relation
This rule combines context sets which are hierarchically included in the other. Here, the




Set1 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set2 = {Worker, Building A}
Set3 = {Manager, Warehouse}
Set4 = {Worker, Warehouse}
Access Policy: Set2 ∨ Set4
Table 6.7: Hierarchical context set
node is the less specic context and therefore includes the parent node. For TOP_DOWN,
the parent includes the child node, and therefore is less specic than it. As seen with Set3
in table 6.7, the rule also works for inheritance over multiple hierarchy levels. Here, the
manager is inheriting access from the worker context, which is two layers.
(a) Initial applied contexts
(b) Applying rule, direction BOTTOM_UP
(c) Applying rule, direction TOP_DOWN
Figure 6.1: Parent child rule
This rule also considers a combination of both directions. Table 6.8 shows an example.




Set1 = {Worker, Building A}
Set2 = {Manager, Assembly}
Access Policy: Set1
Table 6.8: Parent child both directions
6.2.4 Substituting Parent
The concept of this rule is shown in gure 6.2. If all child elements are allowed to access
an SEFF, the child elements are replaced and a new context set is created with the parent
node.
(a) Initial applied contexts
(b) After applying substitute parent rule
Figure 6.2: Substitute parent rule
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Oce}
Set2 = {Worker, Assembly}
Created Set: Set3 = {Worker, Building A}
Access Policy: Set3
Table 6.9: Substituting child nodes with parent node
This rule is only dened for the direction TOP_DOWN. The reason for this is that
hierarchical contexts are usually tree graphs. In this case, this rule would always be true,
since each node only has a parent node.
For this rule, an additional constraint is in place. If this rule is enabled, it should be
ensured that the actual instances of the hierarchical contexts during runtime only contain
leaf nodes. Otherwise, for this rule, the denition of IN is not valid anymore, since the
context set {Worker, Building A} would now have access without explicitly being allowed.
This must be considered when enabling this rule in a project.
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6.2.5 Negative Rule aecting same context set
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set2 = negative, {Worker, Assembly}
Access Policy: error
Table 6.10: Same context error
This rule is similar to the same context rule except that one of the two context sets
needs to be a negative context.
6.2.6 Negative Rule for simpler context set
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set2 = negative, {Worker, Assembly, Remote}
Access Policy: error
Table 6.11: Simpler context error
This rule is similar to the simpler context rule except that the more specic context
needs to be the negative policy.
6.2.7 Negative Rule aecting hierarchical contexts
(a) Initial applied contexts
(b) After applying rules
Figure 6.3: Hierarchical context set with negative - allowed case




(a) Initial applied contexts
Error
(b) After applying substitute parent rule
Figure 6.4: Hierarchical context set with negative - error case
Assigned:
Set1 = {Worker, Assembly}
Set2 = negative, {Worker, Building A}
Set3 = {Worker, Building B}
Set4 = negative, {Worker, Warehouse}
Access Policy: error (Set3 & Set4)
Table 6.12: Hierarchical context set error
6.2.8 Merging Policies aecting the same SEFF
This rule does not combine context sets, it just restructures the existing PolicySpecications.
Since a PolicySpecications can have multiple ContextSets, this rule merges all context sets
to one policy specication. This is mostly a cosmetic rule, since the number of context
sets aecting the SEFF stays the same but the context model becomes more readable.
6.2.9 Removing temporary negative context sets
As mentioned earlier, the context meta-model does not allow the storage of negative




6.3 Order of Rules
In this section, the order in which the rules are executed is briey explained. The resulting
policy of an SEFF can be seen as the following form:
((4C1 ∨ (4C2 ∨ (4C3 ∨ ...) ∧ ¬#460C8E4(4C ∧ ¬#460C8E4(4C2 ∧ ...
All the positive context sets of the SEFF build a disjunction, which is in a conjunction
with all the negative context sets. Therefore, it was decided to see the disjunction as a
separate term and resolve it rst. For the implementation this meant that the positive rule
denitions are executed rst. Combining context sets always leads to the less specic
context set remaining. If rules would resolve multiple times, the least specic or in other
words, most inclusive context set would remain. Therefore, the design decision was made
to execute the rules in a loop. This also meant that the actual order of the individual rules
did not matter.
For the conjunction part of the term, a loop of all negative rule denitions is executed.
This was also the reason for splitting the rules and their negative counter parts into two
separate rule denitions.
There are some rules which have a special purpose and are not executed with the other
rules, but at the end of the loop process. These are the cleanup rule (section 6.2.9) and the
merge rule (section 6.2.8).
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In this chapter the actual implementation of the introduced concepts is described. At rst,
the architecture of the created software is shown, which consists of four parts. Then the
separate parts are illustrated using pseudo code and class diagrams. In the last section, the
test setup is briey explained. The repository with the code can be found here: [28].
7.1 Architecture
The approach was implemented using Java as Eclipse Plugins. The architecture of the

















Figure 7.1: Plugin structure
In order to have a separation of concerns [30] between the two parts of the approach, they
have been implemented as two separate projects. PolicyDeriver implements the deriving
part of the approach and in PolicyReducer the combination process and the dierent rules
are implemented. The fact that the two parts are split into separate plugins allows them to
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be used in possible future work independently of each other in case only one functionality
is needed. As input parameters both receive the needed models and the settings aecting
certain parts of the behaviour, and they both return the adapted context model.
The loading and saving of the dierent used models was put into the separate project
PolicyExtractorCommon. It also provides other basic functions needed in the other plugins
and introduces abstraction classes which help encapsulate often needed functions which
are performed on the models. To be able to execute the approach as a whole the additional
plugin PolicyExtractor was created. It controls the interaction between the PolicyDeriver
and PolicyReducer and contains the classes needed to provide a rudimentary GUI for user
interaction. For the design of the complete approach the model–view–controller (MVC)
[7] software design pattern was used as a guideline.
7.2 Common Functionalities
The component PolicyExtractorCommon provides four packages.
• model: In this package the functions to load and store the data of the models from
les is provided.
• modelabstraction: Here the abstraction classes for the dierent models are provided.
An example is getting the EntryLevelSystemCall contained in a ScenarioBehaviour or
creating or removing context sets from the context model. For the context model
additional classes are provided. HierarchicalContextAbstraction contains all the func-
tions needed for the handling of hierarchical contexts, and ContextSetRecord and
ContextSetRecordCompare can be used for the comparison of context sets in the
implementation of the rules.
• settings: The settings package provides a class to store the parameters provided by
the user via the GUI and pass it on to the other plugins. Additionally, the settings
class can be used in the test cases to adjust the behaviour which needs to be tested.
• util: This package provides basic helper functions and utility classes such as a logger
class.
7.3 Deriving Policies
The PolicyDeriver provides the plugin for deriving the context sets. The constructor takes
PCM models, context model and user settings as input parameters. The interface for this
plugin allows for the execution of the algorithm and to get the new context model with
the derived policies. Algorithm 1 describes the implementation of the concepts described
in 5.2. All logic impacting the PCM models was again encapsulated in a separate class
PalladioAbstraction. This allowed the function to be keep as simple as possible and as
close as possible to the activity diagram dened in the concept. It could also help to easily
extend the approach to other meta models than the PCM in the future.
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Algorithm 1 Deriving Contexts in PCM
1: for B24=0A8> = 1, 2, . . . do
2: for B~BC4<20;; = 1, 2, . . . , # do
3: Calculate aected ses by this systemcall
4: for B4 5 5 = 1, 2, . . . , # do
5: Calculate the contextsets which need to be applied
6: for 34A8E4A'42>A3 = 1, 2, . . . , # do
7: Label: Apply context to se
8: Create policy specication
9: Set values accordingly





Algorithm 2 Find aected ses for the current systemcall
1: Initialize list of aected ses
2:
3: Label: FindMatchingComponent
4: Find match between interface and component in assembly
5: Label: ComponentMatch
6: if BasicComponent then
7: Apply context
8: if exists ExternalCall then
9: for 4GC4A=0;2C8>= = 1, 2, . . . , # do
10: Label: FindExternalComponent
11: if Find matching component in current assembly then
12: Goto ComponentMatch
13: else






20: if Composed Structure then







Algorithm 2 describes the implementation of how the aected SEFFs are found, beginning
from the EntryLevelSystemCall. At rst, the matching component is attempted to be found
in the current assembly. For the initial call of this function the assembly is the system. If
the matching component is found, two cases are possible.
If it is a BasicComponent the SEFF matching the called operation signature has to be
found and it can be added to the list of aected SEFF. If in the SEFF calls to other components
are made, the matching component has to be found for that call. Here parameters like
signature of the called function and the current components are used to nd the matching
component in the current assembly. If there is no matching component, the call goes to
a component outside of the current assembly. Either outside of the complete system or,
if the current assembly is inside a ComposedStructure, the call could go to a component
in the assembly one level higher. The parameters are then updated and the function is
called recursively for the assembly a level higher. Here the recursive depth is limited to
the depth of nested AssemblyContexts.
If a matching component is a ComposedStructure for the current assembly, the matching
component has been found. But since the ComposedStructure has an assembly inside it,
the aected components in that assembly have to be found. This is done with a recursive
call to the function. In each recursive call the hierarchy of nested assemblies is updated
and passed as a parameter. Therefore, if external calls in nested components have to be
found, the nested levels can be returned correctly. ComposedStructure themselves can not
have SEFF, only BasicComponents.
7.4 Calculate context set to apply
Algorithm 3 describes the way the context sets aecting a system call are calculated from
its assigned context sets as designed in section 5.2. The cases for which either only the
EntryLevelSystemCall or the UsageScenario are aected are fairly straight forward as is
the case for which the context is undened. In the case for which both have context sets
assigned, the behaviour is switched with the settings introduced in section 7.6.
For the case that the context sets should be combined, a new context set is created
which contains the contexts of both context sets. A ContextSpecication can only have one
ContextSet assigned to it, but since multiple specications can aect the same system call
or scenario, the combined contexts have to be generated as permutations. Each system
call context set has to be combined with all scenario context sets and vice versa.
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Algorithm 3 Calculating the context set which needs to be applied
1: Initialize recordlist as list of DeriverRecords
2: Set calllist = list of contextsets from systemcall
3: Set behaviourlist = of contextsets from behaviour
4:
5: if calllist is empty then
6: Create records from behaviourlist
7: Return recordlist
8: end if
9: if behaviourlist is empty then
10: Create records from calllist
11: Return recordlist
12: end if
13: if Settings.combineContextSets is enabled then
14: Create records from calllist
15: Return recordlist
16: else
17: SystemCall contexts have priority, use them
18: if systemcall is misusage then





In case of no combination, there are again two options. Either the context sets have the
same priority or the system call context set overrides the default context of the scenario.
In case of same priority, the context sets lists can simply be merged. In case the system
calls have higher priority, two scenarios have to be considered. In case all the system call
context sets are misusage cases, the default context of the scenario must still be applied.
Possible misusage cases dened for the complete scenario have to applied as well even
though the system calls have priority.
For each calculated context set which aects the system call a DeriverRecord is created.
The record is needed since for the PolicySpecications created for the aected SEFFs, not
only the information of the context set is needed, but also the information whether the
created policy is negative. Additionally, the information about which system call and
scenario aect this SEFF with this context set is saved. This information is required if an
error case is detected during the combination process in order to generate a detailed error








Figure 7.2: DeriverRecord class
7.5 Applying Rules
The implementation of the concepts illustrated in chapter 6 is shown here. As described
above, this part was implemented as a stand alone plugin to have a strong separation of
concerns. The main class of the plugin is PolicyReducer, shown in the class diagram 7.3.
For the initialization, the context model and the user settings are needed. The context
model is not passed directly to it; instead the abstraction class introduced in section 7.2 is
used. This is needed since it contains the information about the negative policies, which
cannot be stored in the native context model. The PolicyReducer contains a list of rules
which can be applied to the model. With the settings passed to it, dierent rules can be
enabled or disabled. The class has a main function called execute which will run the plugin.
The pseudo code for this function is given in algorithm 4. The function iterates over the
enabled rules and tries to apply them to the context model. The function contains a while
loop which will be exited if one iteration doesn’t result in any changes to the context
model. This concept is similar to a xed-point iteration. Since each rule could change the
existing context model and create or remove policies, only one iteration over all rules
would not be sucient. Here it is necessary to ensure that two policies do not create a
pattern which results in an endless loop. This could happen if the output of the rst rule
would match as input of the second and vice versa. This was attempted by designing the
rules properly and by testing for this behaviour. Nevertheless, a hard coded condition to
end the loop was added to ensure the program does not crash. In this case, an error is
thrown.
The benet is that the actual order of the rules does not impact the result of the generated
context model. Also, the rules could be designed in a way to keep each rule relatively
simple, relying instead on the other rules applied in the next iteration. If this weren’t
the case, each rule would need to be aware of the order of all rules and which steps have
already happened before its execution. This would have been hard to coordinate with the
option of disabling certain rules.
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Algorithm 4 Apply rules to context model
while 2ℎ0=643 do
Initialize the rules which should be applied
Label: Apply rules to model
for AD;4B = 1, 2, . . . , # do
for B4 5 5 = 1, 2, . . . , # do
Label: Apply specic rule
Compare each context with others aecting this se
for 2>=C4GC(4C_10B4 = 1, 2, . . . , # do
for 2>=C4GC(4C_2><?0A4 = 1, 2, . . . , # do
if rule can be applied then







for AD;4B = 1, 2, . . . , # do
for AD;4B'42>A3 = 1, 2, . . . , # do
if new context created needs to be created then
Create context set according to record
Add context set to model
Add context set to policy
end if
Remove context set from policy
end for
end for





The class diagram 7.3 also shows this general setup of the rules. The PolicyReducer only
has a list of IRulesDenitions, which provides two methods: one for applying the rule to
the model, and the second to execute the rule. These two methods are represented in
algorithm 4 by the labels "Apply rules to model" and "Execute Rules". In the rst method,
the rule will iterate over the context model and try to apply itself to it. A rule works on
all context sets for one SEFF and compares them to each other. If the rule can be applied
to a context set, the model will not be changed immediately but instead a RulesRecord is
created which contains all relevant information. For example, which rule was applied,
43
7 Implementation
which SEFF was aected, if a context set will be removed or a new one created. The second



































Figure 7.3: Class structure for rules
The separation of these functions was done for multiple reasons. The rst was that
some rules delete context sets which would lead to a change in the list over which is
iterated, which is not supported by the implementation language. Another reason was
during the design phase, it was assumed that if two rules aected the same context sets
during the same iteration, the resulting RulesRecords have to be resolved of a possible
conict before the execution. This was not the case. The third reason was that since
the executeRule method works on records which contain all the required information,
this method only needed to be implemented once. This was done in the AbstractRule. It
contains all functions which are the same for all rules and only leaves the abstract function
applyRule(ResourceDemandingBehaviour) for the specic rule classes to be implemented,
which is done according to the described rules in section 6.2. In order to reduce code
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duplication the classes ContextSetRecord and ContextSetCompare were created to capsulate
common functionality.
In chapter 6 the order of positive and negative rules was explained. The implementation
of this lead to two loops of the while loop shown in algorithm 4: the rst for the positive
rules and the second for the negative rules. As the nal step, a cleanup step is executed.
Here, the rules NegativeCleanup and MergeSEFF are run. They are removed from the
normal iteration loop and run once since they only have to be applied once per design.
7.6 Executing the program
The two parts were implemented as separate plugins as mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter. The fourth plugin developed as part of this thesis uses these two parts and
executes them in an ordered manner. Additionally, a rudimentary GUI is provided. It is
not state of the art, as it was not the focus of this thesis, and rather only enables the user
to vary the input parameters for the software.
Figure 7.4: Setting the parameters for the program in the GUI
With these settings, the behaviour of dierent parts of the implementation can be
adapted to the user’s needs. These settings also enable the test setup mentioned in the
next section since it allows the parameters for the test execution to be adapted accordingly.
Figure 7.4 shows the settings which can be adjusted by the user.
7.7 Test Setup
During the development of the software, the tests were developed in parallel. For the
creation of the tests JUnit was used. JUnit is a unit testing framework for the Java pro-
gramming language. The development was done with Java version 11.0.8.
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Similar to the architecture of the four implemented software plugins, four test projects
were implemented. Each of the test projects uses unit-tests to test the individual classes
of the component under test. For the PolicyDeriver and the PolicyReducer additional
system-tests have been created in which the functionality of the component as a whole
is tested. In the test project of the PolicyExtractor, tests for the interaction between the
two components are placed. Additionally, the functionality for the measurements of the
metrics used in the evaluation have been implemented as test classes. This allows for
reproducible measurements and results.
During the development process, continuous integration (CI) [12] was used. This
helped to identify software regressions introduced by changes in the source code, and the
generation of test coverage of the code ensured that the code had been suciently tested.
With 62 test cases a line coverage of 84% is achieved. Some of the uncovered lines are part
of the GUI, which is not executed during the test phase.
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In this chapter, the proposed solution and the designed approach are evaluated with four
case studies. The rst section describes the method which was used to evaluate this thesis.
The used case studies are then introduced. Each of the three dened goals which have been
evaluated has a separate section explaining the test setup and the results. Subsequently,
the threads to validity are explained and limitations and assumptions are shown. Finally,
the dierent results are summarized in a short recap.
8.1 QGM Plan
To evaluate this thesis we used the Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) [2] method which is a goal
oriented approach. For the QGM-method, specic goals are dened which the designed
approach should fulll. Specifying these goals helps to collect relevant data during the
evaluation. After establishing the goals, they are used to develop several questions which
should be answered by the case study. In general, a goal will result in the generation
of multiple questions. Finally, the metrics are dened with which the questions can be
examined on a quantitative basis. In table 8.1, the goals we dened for this thesis can be
found.
Goal 1 : Accuracy
Purpose Evaluate
Focus the correctness
Process for deriving policies
Stakeholder from the security point of view
Goal 2 : Eort reduction
Purpose Improve
Focus the eciency
Process of policy creation
Stakeholder from the developer point of view
Goal 3 : Scalability
Purpose Analyze the
Focus performance
Process of deriving policies
Stakeholder from the developer point of view
Table 8.1: Goals dened for our approach
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The rst thing which we wanted to achieve with our approach was the possibility of
deriving the correct access control policies from the usage and misusage diagrams. In
section 3.5, the two main premises of access control systems are described which should not
be violated by the created approach. Therefore, this goal can be summarized as wanting to
achieve high accuracy while applying the proposed solution. The second goal we wanted
to accomplish was an improvement in eciency for a developer when creating policies
for an access control system during the design phase. A developer creating access control
policies should have a reduced eort with the proposed solution compared to manual
creation. The third goal is to analyze the performance of this new approach. This goal is
less important than the rst two goals, since for the theoretical evaluation of the approach
as a whole, the performance of the program is secondary. But in case the approach is
going to be used in a real environment, it is useful to know how the performance is since
it has a big impact on usability [20].
Goal 1 Accuracy
Question 1.1 Are the correct elements aected while
deriving the policies?
Question 1.2 Are the correct elements aected while
combining the policies?
Question 1.3 Are all erroneous elements found?
Metric 1.1 Precision
Metric 1.2 Recall
Goal 2 Eort reduction
Question 2.1 How high is the eort using this ap-
proach?
Metric 2.1 Ratio of number of policies between
both approaches
Goal 3 Scalability
Question 3.1 How does the runtime scale with cer-
tain parameters?
Metric 3.1 Runtime
Table 8.2: Goals, questions and metrics used for the GQM-method
The dened goals and the questions and measurements derived from them are shown
in table 8.2. For goal G1 three questions arise. The rst is how accurate is the algorithm
regarding the derivation of the policies from the usage diagrams to the SEFFs. The second
is how accurate is the combination and reduction of the context sets in the second step.
The third is that if, in case there is an erroneous conguration as described in chapter 6, to
see if all possible error cases are detected. All these questions are aected by the quality











For Precision P, true positives (TP) and false positives (FP) are used. For Recall R, true
positives (TP) and false negatives (FN ) are used. The denitions of TP, FP and FN depend
on the question being answered. The evaluation and the results for this goal are shown in
section 8.3.
The second goal aims at increasing the eciency. The question derived from this goal is
to evaluate if there is an improvement in eciency in regards to time and, if so, how great
is the improvement. Additionally, an insight into which parameters might inuence the
eort for access policy creation could be helpful for future research projects. The metric
used for answering this question is the number of policies which need to be created with
the help of the new approach compared to the basic approach of using only the context
model.
Denition 3
5 5 >AC'43D2C8>= = 1 − number of policies new approach
number of policies base approach
Section 8.4 analyses this question and shows the results regarding it. With the third
goal, the performance of the developed approach is inspected. The question derived is
how well the program scales in regard to specic parameters. The metric used to answer
this question is the runtime needed to execute the program with the input varied at the




For the evaluation of the dened goals dierent case studies are used. Each of the case
studies has been used in one or more evaluations for new approaches regarding access
control systems and security rules [24] [40] [11]. To the knowledge of the author of this
thesis, no case study which contains both a security description based on contexts, and
a system architecture, which can be used to model the system inside PCM, is available.
Therefore, these case studies have been selected so that at least one aspect, the PCM
models, is available and some information about the intended security aspects, although
not as a context model, is available. Their description of the expected use cases of the
system was used to create a context model based on their security aspects. The created
context models were made to be as tting as possible to the described use cases of the case
studies. The dierent studies were chosen to cover dierent aspects in regards to their
PCM-models.
SMSApp DistanceTracker TravelPlanner EnergyScenario
Interfaces 2 2 8 6
RepositoryComponents 3 2 4 6
AssemblyContexts 3 2 4 8
SEFFs 6 6 10 11
Usagemodels 4 1 1 6
Table 8.3: Comparison of case studies regarding PCM elements
Table 8.3 shows these dierent aspects. For example, the DistanceTracker and the
TravelPlanner case study only contain one usage diagram, the TravelPlanner being the
more complex one in regards to repository and system. The SMSApp represents a well
rounded project, and the EnergyScenario case study describes the most complex system of
these four with a use case in Industry 4.0. In the following, the four case studies are shortly
introduced and the usage scenarios and security model for each is briey explained. The




The application ContactSMSManager [24] consists of two mobile apps: The ContactManager
for managing contact data, which can be used to create new contacts, view existing contacts
or delete them. Additionally, an SMS can be sent to a selected contact. For this functionality
the SMSManager is used, which provides the function to send the message to a selected
number. The security concern with this case study is that only the user should be able
to access the contact information from the ContactManager, and that the SMSManager
tasked with sending the SMS should only have access to the number of the receiver, but
not the other information connected with that contact. The purpose is to show that the
ContactSMSManager doesn’t leak the personal contacts of the user. For this purpose, the
removeName is provided inside the ContactManager to ensure that only the information








 BodyToSend(body := input)
 RetSendSMS()
 SendSMS()
GUI SMSManager ContactManager User
Figure 8.1: Main sequence diagram of the ContactSMSManager app [24]
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The case study contains four UsageModels. Three of them model the dierent actions
the user can do to edit his contacts : AddContact, DeleteContact and ListContacts. The
fourth is the usage diagram for the sending of an SMS. This behaviour is shown in gure
8.1. It describes the interaction between the dierent components in this scenario. The
GUI is the view component in the application, coordinating the interactions between the
dierent modules and the user. The action to send an SMS has happened before the start
of this sequence diagram and the contact to which the SMS should be sent is selected.
This triggers the GUI to receive the information for this contact from the ContactManager.
Before passing the receiver information to the SMSManager, the name of the contact is
removed with the help of the function mentioned above. The user is then asked for the
input which will be the content of the SMS. Afterwards, the SMS will be sent by the
SMSManager to the receiver.
ContextName Type ContextValues
Actor Single User, GUI




Table 8.4: Context model for case study ContactSMSManager
For the evaluation, these scenarios were used to create the context model shown in table
8.4. The context Actor is indicating which entity is executing the system function. The two
possible values are the User, or the ContactSMSManager itself, represented by the context
GUI. The Context Information context represents the amount of information a certain
request wants to access. It is a hierarchical context, since the context with the higher level
of access rights Complete should also be able to access the lower ones, in this case the
declassied ones. For this case study, four scenarios are created. S1 contains the normal,
good use case of the system while the second also contains misusage parameters explicitly
forbidding the access to not declassied information for all requests not coming from the
user. In addition to these two positive cases, two negative scenarios are dened which
should result in errors being found during the execution of the program. The rst is a a
result of the fact that both the user and the GUI need access to the getContactList function.
If the misusage scenario for the sendSMS only forbids access to a context complete instead
of the context set {complete,GUI}, the access will also be blocked for the user, who wants to
access it with the context set {complete,user}. The second represents a misconguration by
the GUI trying to call the deleteContact function, which should not be allowed.
8.2.2 Distance Tracker
The DistanceTracker is a jogging app developed with the IFlow approach [24]. The user
can use the mobile application DistanceTracker to start GPS tracking prior to running and
the app will record the current position periodically during the run. Once the user stops
tracking, the list of recorded GPS positions will be used to calculate a route which will then
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be sent to the web service TrackerService. The web service can be used to communicate
with other users and compare the tracked distances. From a security perspective, the app
shall only be allowed to track the current position if started, the web service shall not
receive the position of the user, only the calculated distance, and the app shall only have
access to the current location of the current run and not store GPS-positions from earlier
runs.
The main use case of this system is described in the sequence diagram 8.2. The User
is greeted by a welcome message at the start of the app. Then the user is able to start
the tracking of the run with StartTracking and stop it with StopTracking. Internally, the
DistanceTracker stores the information if a tracking is currently in progress or not in a
state ag. After the user stops the current run, the run distance is calculated. The user
then has the option to release the information to the TrackerService. Only if he conrms
the release should the information be sent to the server, otherwise the information should
be deleted.
The context model for this case study is shown table 8.5. The context Actor distinguishes
between the user of the app and the app itself. The Distance Data is a hierarchical context
with a depth of 3. It describes in which format the data is requested. raw contains
the complete GPS information, calcualted is the distance contained internally by the
DistanceTracker, and declassied is the distance data after being released by the user to
the TrackerService. For this case study again two positive scenarios are created, one with
(S2) and one without (S1) the misusage information. The scenario S3 describes a wrong
conguration of the system for which the app tries to declassify the distance data by itself,
which is forbidden by a misusage diagram. S4 is a scenario in which the data which should
be sent to the TrackerService is the raw data and not the distance which was released by the
user. The last scenario describes a misusage in which the data which should be released
by the user is not the calculated distance but instead still the raw data.
ContextName Type ContextValues
Actor Single User, App










    releaseDist(dist)
dist: calcDist(act)
act: Activity = createActivity(

























The case study TravelPlanner [40] is a distributed application which allows a user to nd
relevant ight oers for his trip and book them. The TravelPlanner app can be run on
mobile devices which allows the users to check the TravelAgency web service for available
and suitable ight oers. If the user wants to book one of the proposed oers, he can
select the chosen oer and book it directly over the web service of the Airline. All the
payments carried out in this scenario are done with the help of a CreditCardCenter app.
This app contains the user’s credit card information, for which the user has to verify
himself. Additionally, he can release his credit card data to the airline in order for them
to collect the money if a ight is booked. In this case, the airline also informs the travel
agency about the successful booking and pays them a commission.
The sequence diagram in gure 8.3 shows the main use case of this case study. All the
actions are triggered by the user. The initial action is requesting the current ight oers
according to the search parameters. This request is started by the user and then propagated
from the user to the TravelPlanner, TravelAgency and then the Airline. To book a selected
ight, the credit card data has to be released to the TravelAgency rst. This is one of the
misusage scenarios for this case study. In order to release the credit card data, the user
has to be authorized rst. This is a second misusage scenario. The two policies needed
to model the access rights are that releasing the credit card information is only allowed
after the user has authorized himself and that booking the ight is only allowed to users
who have released their credit card information. From the description of this use case the
context model is dened. Table 8.6 shows the created context model. CreditCard-Status is
a HierarchicalContext, which inherits its access rights bottom up. The two values for this
context are either authorized or non-authorized. Both the context TravelAgency-CreditCard-
Status and App-Status are SingleContexts. The rst one indicates if the user has already
released his credit card information, the second contains the information about whether
the user has already requested the current ight oers or if he has already booked a ight










App-Status Single not requested, requested, conrmed
Table 8.6: Context model of travelplanner
For this case study, ve scenarios are created. S1 is the normal use case, described
in sequence diagram 8.3. The second also describes the positive use of the system, but
explicitly contains the described forbidden use cases as misusage diagrams. In addition















































































































errors being found during the execution of the program. The rst misusage scenario
handles the case of the user dening the initial context set for the complete usage scenario
as a default value, and not specifying a more detailed context set for the operations
which need to be secured. The default value clashes with the forbidden context sets of
the misusage diagrams. The second and third misusage scenarios handle the dierent
cases of hierarchical misusage. The rst ensures that the inherited access rights from the
CreditCard-Status do not lead to the access for unwanted context sets, and the second one
for the TravelAgency-Status.
8.2.4 Energy Scenario
The case study Energy Scenario describes an energy management system (EnMS) in the
TRUST 4.0 environment [11]. Information about the ow of energy contains a high level
of information about business activities which allow conclusions about expenses and
workow of the business. Therefore, this information has to be protected by some kind of
access control. Figure 8.4 shows the main scenario of this case study. The system has two
dierent kinds of sensor. The PushingSensor periodically pushes its data to the server, the
data of the PullingSensor has to requested. The EnerChart collects the data and periodically
sends it to the OPCUAServer. The dierent users have access to the data through interfaces
provided by the Trust40 platform, which periodically polls the server. Each of the parts
of the system which need to store data have a separate instance of a time series database
(TimeSeriesDB) to save the data. The system has 3 dened use cases. The energy ocer
should always be allowed to request the data of the EnMS. For company internal expense
calculations the EnMS should allow the request for the aggregated information for a
dened time period. In the third use case, an external service company should be granted














Reading method Single manual, periodic
Table 8.7: Context model of energyscenario
The derived context model for this case study can be found in the table 8.7. The context
Employment describes if the user is employed by the company or is from a hired external




















 data: TimeSeries =
read()
 getFineGrainedData()






Trust40 TimeSeriesDB(Multiple Instances) OPCUAServer EnerChartLogic Sensor
Figure 8.4: Sequence diagram for the EnergyScenario case study
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or for an employee who has more access rights in regards to the EnMS. The context set
{normal, internal} should be allowed to access the monthly data by calling the function
getMonthlyData() while the external employee shouldn’t. The energy ocer is described
by {expert, internal} and the external technician by {expert, external}. The context Location
is used to describe if the user has access to the information while being on the company
site or if he is able to request the information remotely. The last context distinguishes
between manual access by the user or periodic access from the system and the sensors.
For this case study, ve scenarios are dened. S1 describes the positive use of the system
as described in gure 8.4, and S2 describes the same usage but additionally contains the
forbidden use cases modelled as misusage diagrams. S3 describes a wrong conguration in
which the periodic functions are manually requested by the user. S4 describes a scenario
in which an external employee tries to request the monthly data from the EnMS which is
a functionality only provided to internal users. In scenario S5 the external technician tries
to request the energy data without having the access rights granted.
8.3 Accuracy
For the goal G1 Accuracy three questions were dened. The rst is regarding the accuracy
of deriving the policies, the second regarding the combination process of the context
sets and the third is in regard to error detection. However, the metrics derived for these
three questions are the same: Precision and Recall, as suggested by Metz.[31] Only the
denition of the parameters used to evaluate these metrics is going to dier from question
to question.
The rst metric is Precision. For this metric, the true positives (TP) and false positives
(FP) are used to calulate the precision % = )%
)%+% . The denition of TP and FP depends on
the question being answered. For the accuracy of deriving policies, TP is going to be the
number of SEFFs which are aected by an EntryLevelSystemCall and, after the execution,
have a policy assigned to them. FP, in this case, is the number of SEFFs which have a policy
assigned to them for the corresponding EntryLevelSystemCall even though they are not
aected by it.
For the question of how accurate the PolicyReducer is, TP is dened as the number of
context sets for which the reducer has found elements which can be reduced. FP are the
context sets which are aected by the reducer even though they are not aected by the
corresponding EntryLevelSystemCall.
In regards to errors, TP are the errors found while executing the algorithm. FP, in this
case, are all errors which have been detected but which are not actual errors.
The second metric used is Recall. For this metric the true positives (TP) and false
negatives (FN ) are used to calulate the recall ' = )%
)%+# . Again, the denition of TP and
FN depends on the question. TP is going to be the same for the calculation of R as it has
been for P. For deriving policies, FN is the number of SEFFs which do not have a policy
assigned to them for the corresponding EntryLevelSystemCall after the execution of the
Deriver. FN in regards to the PolicyReducer is the number of context sets which should be
aected by the reducer but haven’t been aected be the execution. For the detection of
errors, FN are all the possible error cases not detected by the algorithm.
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TP TF FN Precision in % Recall in %
SMSApp
S1 7 0 0 100 100
S2 7 0 0 100 100
DistanceTracker
S1 6 0 0 100 100
S2 6 0 0 100 100
Travelplanner
S1 8 0 0 100 100
S2 8 0 0 100 100
EnergyScenario
S1 19 0 0 100 100
S2 19 0 0 100 100
Table 8.8: Accuracy for deriving policies
The results for the accuracy measurement in regards to deriving policies are shown in
table 8.8. For all the scenarios in all the case studies we achieve a precision and a recall of
100%. This is an expected result, since the classes have been tested as described in chapter
7.7 and that no predictions or heuristics are used during the deriving process. The use of
these could be a topic for future works as described in section 10.1. An observation that
can be made is that both the scenario with only the use of usage diagrams and the scenario
with misusage diagrams have the same amount of expected derived policies (TP). This is
explained by the fact that the derived misusage policies do not lead to policies in the nal
context model, since the model is not able to represent negative policies as described in
section 3.6. Instead, they are only used during the combination process to evaluate the
correctness of the context model. A derivation between the TP-value between scenario 1
and 2 of a case study would rather indicate a wrong setup of the evaluation scenarios.
TP TF FN Precision in % Recall in %
SMSApp
S1 7 0 0 100 100
S2 10 0 0 100 100
DistanceTracker
S1 6 0 0 100 100
S2 9 0 0 100 100
Travelplanner
S1 8 0 0 100 100
S2 12 0 0 100 100
EnergyScenario
S1 15 0 0 100 100
S2 22 0 0 100 100
Table 8.9: Accuracy for reducing policies
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The results for the accuracy measurement in regards to the policy reduction and com-
bination are shown in table 8.9. For all the scenarios in all the case studies we achieve a
precision and a recall of 100%. This is again an expected result in the same manner that the
modules have been tested by unit tests as described in chapter 7.7 and that no predictions
or heuristics are used during the combination process. The dierence between the above
results is that in these measurements we expect to see a dierence between the scenarios
with and without misusage diagrams. Since the misusage diagrams result in temporary
policies used for validation there exist more policies for which rules can be applied. This
is the explanation for the increase in TP-value between the scenarios 1 and 2 in each case
study.
TP TF FN Precision in % Recall in %
SMSApp
S2 0 0 0 100 100
S3 1 0 0 100 100
S4 1 0 0 100 100
DistanceTracker
S2 0 0 0 100 100
S3 1 0 0 100 100
S4 1 0 0 100 100
S5 1 0 0 100 100
Travelplanner
S2 0 0 0 100 100
S3 4 0 0 100 100
S4 1 0 0 100 100
S5 3 0 0 100 100
EnergyScenario
S2 0 0 0 100 100
S3 8 0 0 100 100
S4 2 0 0 100 100
S5 4 0 0 100 100
Table 8.10: Accuracy for detecting errors
Table 8.10 shows the results of the measurement of error accuracy. Again, the same
reasons apply which result in the precision and a recall of 100% being the expected values.
The scenarios 1 were excluded in this evaluation since they do not contain misusage
diagrams and therefore no contradicting policies can exist. The scenario 2 for each case
study shows a TP of 0, which means no errors are expected to be found. These scenarios
are used to show that with a correct conguration with both usage and misusage diagrams,
no errors are expected and no errors are mistakenly thrown. The rest of the scenarios




For the second goal G2 Eort Reduction, the improvement of eciency of the developer
while creating an access policy system should be measured. Therefore, the two approaches
should be compared with each other in regards to the eort needed to create the complete
system access policy specication. For the measurement, not the actual eort for creating
the access policy description is measured, since for this evaluation, no experiment was
conducted. Instead, the eort for creating the system specication is approximated by the
number of policies needed to specify the complete system.
The assumption in this evaluation is that the developer creating the specication is
trained in the used environment and knows the tools used for modeling the system and
for the creation of the policies, in this case Palladio. Additionally, we assume that during
the normal development process the process artifacts are already created. This means the
eort for creating usage diagrams, repository and system models is not measured as part of
this evaluation. Another assumption made for the evaluation of this measurement is that
the eort for creating policies takes the same amount of time with both approaches. This
assumption is based on the fact that both the Policy Specication, used for modeling policies
of the data element on the SEFF level, and the Context Specication, used for modeling
policies on usage diagram level, take the same number of elements to create, only deviating
in the link to the PCM-element connected to them. Since the developer creating the policies
knows the environment, we assume nding the corresponding elements inside the PCM
model takes roughly the same amount of time for both the approach using SEFFs and the
approach using usage diagrams.
With these assumptions made, the analysis for the improvement in eciency is done by
comparing the number of policies needed to be created by the developer. The base value
for the comparison is the manual creation of policies with the context model. The policies
have to be created for each SEFF individually. The second value is the number of policy
specications needed to be created with the new approach. For system calls in the usage
models, the policy specications have to be created. Additionally, the unwanted usage
scenarios can be specied with the help of misusage diagrams. For the measurement, these
two cases where split into two separate measurements since the complete system can
theoretically be described with only the usage diagrams and no misusage diagrams. To
ensure that both approaches cover the same access policy specication of the system we
use the results from chapter 8.3. Since the approach has shown to have high precision and
recall we assume that the derived policies matched the polices created for the comparison.
The scenarios used for the dierent measurements of each case study are described in
section 8.2. For the measurement without the use of misusage diagrams, scenario 1 of each
case study is used, and for measurements with the specication of misusage diagrams,
scenario 2 is used. Both scenarios cover the same use of the system, with scenario 2 also
explicitly ensuring the unwanted access of certain elements is guaranteed.
The results of the measurement without the use of misusage diagrams is shown in table
8.11. The SMSApp case study has the least amount of reduction with an eort reduction
of 33%. The case studies DistanceTracker and Travelplanner have a reduction of 50% or
more. This shows that with the new approach a clear reduction of eort can be achieved.




% Reduction in %
New Base
CS1: SMSApp 4 6 67 33
CS2: DistanceTracker 3 6 50 50
CS3: Travelplanner 3 8 38 62
CS4: EnergyScenario 6 11 55 45
Table 8.11: Comparison with only usage diagrams
number of policies in the base approach was limited to only 1 policy per SEFF. So with this
assumption, the minimal subset of policies needed to describe the system was used. In a
real environment it might be the case that the user does not work in the optimal way and
instead creates multiple policies aecting the same SEFF (for example for better human
readable context policies), which would therefore increase the number of total policies.
This would lead to an even lower ratio between the two approaches meaning an even
higher eort reduction percentage.
Number of policies
% Reduction in %
New Base
CS1: SMSApp 6 6 100 0
CS2: DistanceTracker 5 6 84 16
CS3: Travelplanner 5 8 63 37
CS4: EnergyScenario 9 11 82 18
Table 8.12: Comparison with misusage diagrams
The results of the measurement with the access right violations explicitly modeled as
misusage diagrams are shown in table 8.12. Compared to the results without the use of
misusage diagrams, it is observed that each case study has a lower eort reduction. In
the case of case study 1, the ContactSMSManager, there is no eort reduction at all. This
result was expected, since the number of policies in each case study increased by adding
the misusage diagrams, but the number of data elements represented by the SEFFs stayed
the same. So in regards to the eort reduction, the use of misusage diagrams seems to be
counterproductive. But with the use of the misuage diagrams, the benet of the additional
verication of the access policies is added. So in a productive use of this new approach, a
certain compromise between verication and eort reduction has to be made.
To analyse which parameters have an inuence on the eort reduction we use the PCM
parameters shown in table 8.3. Since the number of Interfaces, RepositoryComponents and
AssemblyContexts indirectly inuence the number of SEFFs, we only analyze the eort
reduction in relation to the number of SEFFs and Usagemodels. The two graphs in gures
8.5 and 8.6 show the eort reduction in regards to these two parameters of the case studies.
The rst shows the relation between the number of SEFFs and the eort reduction, the
second between the number of usage diagrams and the amount of eort reduction. In both
diagrams no clear relation between these parameters and the amount of eort reduction
can be seen. By looking more closely at the case study with the highest eort reduction,
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the Travelplanner case study, which has only one usage diagram, but the second highest
amount of SEFFs, the assumption can be made that the eort reduction might depend on
the relation between these two parameters. This relation is shown in gure 8.7. The graph
indicates that this assumption might be correct, but the data size is too small to come to
a clear conclusion. This could be a topic for further research. In all three graphs it can
be clearly seen that the amount of eort reduction is directly inuenced by the use of
misusage diagrams.
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Figure 8.5: Eort reduction in relation to number of SEFFs
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E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Figure 8.6: Eort reduction in relation to number of usage models
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For the goal of scalability the case studies are not used for the evaluation; instead a model
is generated according to certain parameters. Each parameter is varied in a range while the
other parameters are kept the same to see the eect of this parameter. Both PCM-model
as well as context-model parameters are varied. For the test setup, a model generator was
implemented which would create the dierent models accordingly. The models generated
are the usage model, the system model, the repository model and the context model. The
generated models are created consistent to each other. To account for variance in execution
time due to side eects each measurement for one parameter variation was run multiple
times and the average of the measurements was taken. Also during the rst runtime
analysis, it was observed that the rst few runtime measurements highly dier from the
rest of the measurements. A warmup phase was introduced in which the measurements




2 # methods per interface
3 # assembly composition depth
4 # assembly composition with
5 # usage diagrams
6 # system calls
ContextModel
7 # context sets
8 # contexts per context set
9 # hierarchical context depth
10 # hierarchical context width
11 # policies
12 # contexts per policy
Table 8.13: Parameters which are varied during the runtime analysis
The list of parameters which are varied are shown in table 8.13. Parameter 1 describes
the number of interfaces existing in the repository model. Increasing this parameter results
in more interfaces per component and therefore in an increase in the total number of
SEFFs. Additionally, this parameter also aects the total number of AssemblyConnectors in
the system model. Parameter 2 inuences the number of operations each interface has.
This also increases the total number of SEFFs the same way parameter 1 does, but does not
aect the number of AssemblyConnectors present in the assembly.
Parameters 3 and 4 both aect the composite components inside the system model. With
parameter 3, the depth of nested composite components is varied. A value of 10 means
that beginning on the highest level, the system composition, each assembly context on this
level will be a composite composition containing themselves composite components with
a depth of 9. Parameter 4 varies the width of each composite component. A value of 10
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means each composite component contains a chain of 10 assembly context with, beginning
with the rst, each of them being connected to the next in chain over an AssemblyConnector
and having an ExternalCall on the repository level. Even though parameter 3 increases
the number of composite components on the assembly level, the total number of basic
components is not aected, and therefore the number of SEFFs stays the same as well.
Parameter 4 on the other hand increases the number of basic components and therefore
the number of SEFFs.
Parameters 5 and 6 vary the parameter of the usage model. Increasing parameter 5 leads
to more usage diagrams and therefore more scenario behaviours respectively. Parameter
6 aects how often each operation of the provided system interfaces is called. Both
parameters lead to an increase in EntryLevelSystemCalls and therefore an increase in the
numbers of policy specications aecting each SEFF, but the number SEFFs stays the same
when varying them.
Parameter 7 changes how many context sets are available and parameter 8 increases the
amount of context each context set has assigned to it. These parameters don’t aect the
amount of SEFFs present. Parameter 9 and 10 change the hierarchical contexts inside the
context model. With the hierarchical context depth, the amount of layers in a hierarchical
context is increased, meaning the longest path from root to the furthest child gets longer.
The hierarchical context width changes how many child nodes each hierarchical context
has in one layer. Parameter 11 changes how many policies are present in the model when
the reducer is applied, and parameter 12 increases the number of context sets each policy
specication has assigned to it.
Id
ParameterValue
1 10 25 50 100 150 200
1 0.0064 0.0361 0.2128 0.4145 9.932 - -
2 0.0004 0.0053 0.0208 0.0684 0.2646 0.5387 0.9406
3 0.0004 0.0012 0.0021 0.0043 0.01 0.0153 0.0326
4 0.0004 0.008 0.0237 0.0796 0.2691 - -
5 0.0005 0.0047 0.0198 0.0658 0.2283 0.5478 0.87
6 0.0005 0.0052 0.015 0.0629 0.2369 0.5019 0.8953
Table 8.14: Runtime results for PCM parameters
The results of the runtime analysis by varying the PCM-model parameters (Parameters
1-6) can be found in table 8.14. Additionally, the results are shown as a graph in gure 8.8.
In general, the results can be grouped into 3 categories. The rst group is the parameters
which not not to inuence the runtime at all in a signicant way. In our case this is
parameter 3, the depth of the hierarchical context. The second group is the parameters
aecting the runtime in a linear way. These are the parameters 2,4,5,6. The last group seems
to cause an exponential eect on the runtime. This seems to be the case for parameter
1. One observation is that the number of aected SEFFs seems not to be the inuential
factor for this exponential increase in runtime, since not all parameters which increase
the amount of aected SEFFs are in this third group.
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Figure 8.8: Graph plotting the runtime results
There are two incomplete measurements in the table 8.14. One is for the parameter 1
for values higher than 100. Here, the problem was that the measurement did not seem
to be able to be completed in a reasonable time frame and was manually aborted. This
observation aligns with the rest of the measurements for this parameter indicating an
exponential eect in runtime. One possible explanation could be that the number of
Assembly Connectors causes this issue. For real use cases, this high number of Assembly
Connectors for a single Assembly Context seems not to be realistic and can therefore be
ignored. The second incomplete measurement is for parameter 4, also for values over
100. Here, the issue was a stack-overow exception caused by the recursive handling of
external calls described in chapter 7.3. Since the issue was found during the evaluation
step, the time frame of this thesis didn’t allow for a bigger functional change inside this
handling of the algorithm. Similar to the rst parameter, the issue seems not to be relevant
for realistic use cases, since the issue was caused by a long chain of components (more
than 1000 components chained after each other). For the impact of this parameter on the
runtime, we take the trend of the rst measurements to assume a linear runtime eect.
Table 8.15 displays the results for the parameters 7-12, which aect the context model.
These parameters are not plotted since only one of them seems to have a signicant eect
on the runtime of the program. Parameter 11, which increases the number of policy
specications, seems to have a linear eect on the runtime. The results for this section
were computed on laptop, the specications can be found in table 8.16.
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Id
ParameterValue
1 10 25 50 100 150 200
7 0.0042 0.0443 0.0348 0.0193 0.0225 0.0211 0.0186
8 0.0013 0.0014 0.001 0.0012 0.0014 0.002 0.0012
9 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
10 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005
11 0.0001 0.0005 0.0093 0.0234 0.108 0.3202 0.7865
12 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004




Processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4600U CPU
@ 2.10GHz, 2694 Mhz, 2 Core(s),
4 Logical Processor(s)
Installed Physical Memory (RAM) 12.0 GB
OS Name Microsoft Windows 10 Pro
Table 8.16: Hardware specication
8.6 Threats to Validity
The threats to validity are structured into four categories, according to the guidelines
for case study research of Runeson and Höst[38]. The categories are described in the
following.
• Internal validity: Internal validity ensures that only the factors we expect to have
an inuence are the inuencing factors and therefore our assumption about cause
and eect is correct. We assume that the inuencing factors for this evaluation are
the used scenarios and models. This factor was reduced by not creating new models
and instead using models which are already existing and have been used in other
evaluations. Additionally, the case studies had descriptions of their use case and their
security constraints. This information was used to create the used context models
and the additional scenarios for the misusage cases. A possible invalidity might have
been introduced with this step. This risk we tried to minimize by using four case
studies. For the performance evaluation, only one parameter was changed at a time
to ensure the eect of it can be measured without the inuence of other eects.
• External validity: External validity allows the application of the ndings of this evalu-
ation to other contexts and therefore to generalize them in respect to other situations
and use cases. Runeson and Höst [38] describe that case study based evaluations
are good for understanding a phenomenon instead of yielding a result which has
a great representativeness. According to them, results conducted with case studies
can help understand cases with similar characteristics. The results of this evaluation,
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therefore, may be applicable to cases which both have a dynamic environment which
can be modelled with contexts and for which a security description on the usage
model level, meaning on the interface level to the system, is possible. This belief is
armed by the fact that multiple external case studies were used which all indicated
the same behaviour of our approach.
• Construct validity: This category ensures that the metrics used to answer the ques-
tions dened in section 8.1 are correct and that the measurements can be explained
according to how the system should behave. The accuracy metrics we dened ac-
cording to Metz[31]. The resulting measurements of precision and recall were as we
expected. For the performance measurement the runtime seems to be the perfect
t. Here, the results of the measurements could also be explained with the used
algorithm. For the eort reduction, we used a metric for which we had to make
some assumptions. Here, a conducted experiment might have yielded more accurate
results but we think that the results in some cases of more than 50% reduction give
some indication that the new approach can have an eort reduction compared to
the normal context based approach. Additionally, we gained some insights into how
the use of misusage diagrams inuence this metric. In general, there is less room
for interpretation of the results with the use of metrics than, for example, a survey
where the answers have to be further interpreted.
• Reliability: Reliability means that the results are reproducible and do not depend on
the researcher executing the evaluation. For the accuracy measurements, the values
needed to calculate precision and recall do not vary for dierent executions since
the program does not depend on heuristics or randomness. For the eort reduction,
no experiment was conducted which is good in regards to reliability. In the case
studies, dierent policies could be used for the evaluation, but here the limitation
we made to limit the number of policies to 1 per SEFF ensures the value may only
vary in a benecial direction. The results of the performance measurements may
vary depending on the hardware on which it is executed but the general inuence
of the dierent parameters and their eect on the runtime should be the same. For
all three goals, the measurements of the metrics were done using an automated test
setup as described in chapter 7.7. This ensures that all the results are reproducible
and do not depend on the executing researcher.
8.7 Summary of the validation
With the GQM-method and the four used case studies, the conducted evaluation showed
that the new approach is able to accurately derive and combine policies from usage and
misusage diagrams and that, in most cases, the eort for the creation of policies can be
reduced. Accuracy was chosen as the most important goal, since the correct handling
of access policies is fundamental to each access system, and the evaluation concluded
that both parts, derivation and reduction, had a precision and recall of 100 %. The results
suggest a high accuracy of our approach. Additionally, the accuracy of detecting errors
showed that possible errors in the conguration of the system done by the user can be
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detected with the help of misusage diagrams. This validation of the context model impacts
the eort reduction since the eort of creating the misusage diagrams is added. The
evaluation of eort reduction concluded that even with the assumption of having only 1
policy per SEFF the new approach is able to reduce the eort in creating policies in regards
to using the context based access system. Additionally, it was analyzed which parameters
had an eect on the runtime and to what extent. This analysis can be helpful for future
works which use this thesis as a foundation.
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9 Assumptions and Limitations
For this thesis we made some assumptions and limitations during the development of the
approach to make it feasible for the given time frame. In this chapter, these assumptions
and limitations are summarized and in the next chapter we describe how some of them
can be removed in future.
9.1 Assumptions
One of the assumptions made was that all the models used during the derivation and
reduction process are valid. This means the underlying Ecore models have been checked
for any violations, for example, in regards to multiplicities of elements, required elds
or upper and lower bounds of elements. Additionally, we assume that the models are
"logically" correct. This means that, for example, in the ComposedComponent there is no
instance of itself which would lead to an endless depth of nested components, or that the
AssemblyContexts are not connected in a circular way with themselves and without system
interfaces. We added checks at possible problematic locations and tested accordingly, but
we cannot guarantee that all possible miscongurations were found [8].
For the evaluation we made the assumption that the eort for creating the PolicySpeci-
cation on the SEFF level takes the same amount of time as the creation of the ContextSpeci-
cation in the usage diagrams. This was due to the fact that both specications contain
roughly the same number of elements to create. This was based on another assumption that
the developer creating the policies knows both the PCM models and the context models
equally well. These assumptions were made to be able to make an observation in regards
to the eort reduction properties of the approach without conducting an actual experiment.
Since multiple case studies were used which all indicate some eort reduction we feel
condent in our belief that this new approach can reduce the eort for creating policies.
However, a real experiment might need to be conducted to conrm these assumptions.
Since access control per denition grants access to resources, we made the assumption
that SEFFs can be used as an abstraction for data elements. Additionally we restricted this
further in that each data element is only represented by one SEFF and vice versa. This
assumption also includes the expectation that the complete security description can be
done with the information of the SEFFs.
9.2 Limitations
One limitation of the current approach is that the policy specications in the context model
are assigned to SEFFs instead of AssemblyContext. This leads to the fact that dierent
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instances of the component cannot be dierentiated and are treated as one in regards to
the security aspects. For the evaluation, this didn’t have an eect since, as a workaround,
multiple versions of a component can be created in the repository for each used instance.
For the use of our approach this might need to be kept in mind, since it could lead to
wrong congurations. A solution to this would be to change the context model, which is
outlined in section 10.4.
Another limitation is that the instance of the dierent model types is currently limited
to one for each model type. This didn’t have an impact on the evaluation since the four
case studies already fullled this limitation. In a real life setting, this might not be the case.
The changes needed to adapt the software for multiple les are described in section 10.2.
With the current implementation it is not possible to store the context derived from the
misusage diagrams. This means they are only created temporarily and removed after the
execution of the program. The reason for this is that the context model does not allow
the storage of negative contexts or policies. While it might be helpful to be able to store
these negative contexts, there are also some negative aspects connected to it. For example,
the evaluation of a policy misconguration might be moved from the design phase to the
runtime phase if conicts are not resolved. If no conicts are present there is currently no
need to store the negative information about context. In the end, this limitation is part of
the context model and cannot be resolved within this thesis.
The current approach only works well for systems where the security description is
available in the form of system usage. For example, the information forbids the use of a
certain function of a component, but the use of this component inside the system is not
clear. This is due to the fact that, in the derivation process, it is not possible to assign
context specications to internal calls directly, only on system calls. However, since the
approach is backwards compatible to the normal context model, it is still possible to
manually create PolicySpecications which will then be considered during the combination
process. Since it is not possible to save negative context specication in the context model,
it only allows the addition of positive access policies. It is therefore not possible to, for
example, explicitly forbid access for one particular function, instead the complete chain of
functions is always aected.
Another limitation is that the role responsible for the creation of the usage diagrams
has to know the security aspects of the system. In this case, this role is the domain expert.
If the security expert of the system is a dierent person than the domain expert, the
responsibility for the usage models is shared between two roles, which conicts with the
idea of having separation of concerns between the roles.
During the evaluation, two limitations of the current software implementation were
also found. The rst is the limit for maximum length of the chain of external calls. The
second, the number of interfaces of each component. We assume that both of these limits
are greater than the realistic values present in projects, therefore they should not be
problematic for the use of the software.
The design decision not to use a policy combining language but instead implement
the rules as classes working directly on the context model is also a limitation. With this
approach, if new policies should be added, as suggested in section 10.3, the code of the
software needs to be changed. With the use of a policy combining language the changes
can be made directly in the language by adding a new policy combining algorithm. The
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advantage of the chosen design is that no additional model in the form of the policy
combining language was needed, otherwise the specied contexts would have to be
transformed from the context model into the language model after the derivation process,
and back after the combination process. With the current approach, both parts can be
done using only the context model. This also reduced the risk of possible complications
during the development process.
Another limitation is that the current rules do not include any heuristics or any form
of generalization. So for a rule to be applied to the context set, the exact criteria of its
denition have to be met. A possible way to extend this behaviour is illustrated in section
10.1.
With the approach it is also not possible to resolve possible errors found during the
combination process. In the case of an error, additional knowledge of the security expert
is needed since it could arise for two dierent reasons: Either the conguration of the
context is wrong and needs to be adapted, or if the assigned context for the usage scenario





In future work, several topics can be further investigated. The use of heuristics might be
helpful in removing some of the limitations of the current approach, more implementation
of rule-sets might give a higher eort reduction and the extension to include multiple les
and systems might increase the applicable use cases. These topics are briey described in
this chapter.
10.1 Adding Heuristics
Some of the approaches mentioned in chapter 4 use heuristics to merge and simplify
policies. An example for this is shown in gure 10.1. The element in the example is
aected by all but one child context of a hierarchical context set (direction down). With
the current design decision to treat contexts which are not explicitly allowed as forbidden
contexts no combination is possible. Instead of this hard limitation, a dierent approach
would be to have them as an uncertain state. Then a heuristic could be "if 75% of child
contexts are allowed, and no negative child contexts are present" the child contexts get
substituted for the parent context. This would extend the implementation of the rule
mentioned in section 6.2.4.
The problem with optimization based policy creation is that the simplied policies might
over-t the input data if it does not generalize well and therefore would not be robust [46].
To generate good heuristics a lot of test data is needed in order to have an accurate and
robust prediction model [36]. These were reasons why this feature was not included as
part of this master thesis.
10.2 Increase Scope of Approach
The current implementation only allows one le for each model type like the repository
model or the context model. For the scope of this thesis this limitation had no impact
on the functionality. For a real usage in an environment with multiple developers this
might be dierent. For example, dierent developers could work on separate components
and describe the context model for the parts they are responsible for. To add this feature
the modelloader class needs to be extended to be able to handle multiple les per model
type and in the algorithms, another loop iterating the models needs to be added. A more
diculty aspect to handle is how possible changes to the models need to be saved, for
example to which le new created policies should be added.
Another aspect is the system boundaries. Currently, the created approach works on




(a) Initial applied contexts
(b) After applying rule using heuristics
Figure 10.1: Simplifying hierarchical context set with heuristics
work could increase this scope to allow multiple systems. Here, the chain started at
one EntryLevelSystemCall might not only aect components inside the system but also
components in dierent systems. Additionally, the validation done with the misusage
diagrams could be extended to multiple systems. For example, multiple systems might have
no access violations in the context model conguration on their own, but the interaction
between dierent systems could lead to possible access violations.
10.3 Addingmore Rule Implementations
The iterative process used during development meant rules were created in succession
after the previous rule was added to the policyreducer and tested. For some of the rules
which were created in the design step of the thesis the time frame didn’t allow for them
to be implemented and tested in a sucient manner. These rules can be implemented in
future to add more functionality to the plugin.
Figure 10.2 shows an example in which the parent element of a hierarchical context
(direction down) is part of a context set as well as a negative child element. Currently, this
conguration would result in an error as described in 6.2.7, since the child element should
not have access, but inherits it from the parent node. One possible way to resolve this
situation is seen in b). The parent node is removed from the context set, and instead all the
child elements are added to it. Therefore these child elements would not inherit the access
policy indirectly, but would have explicit allowed access. For the negative child element
no access policy is created. The side eect would be that policies with context sets only
referencing the parent context would not be allowed anymore. But for an access control
system where only the policy denition contains the parent context and where the actual
instances will contain only the leaf nodes, this rule would work without this side eect.
This rule would, therefore, depend on the actual implementation of the access control
system using the context based approach. Additionally, other researchers might come up
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(a) Initial applied contexts
(b) After applying new rule
Figure 10.2: Possible rule for positive parent context with negative child context
with ideas for new rules and more possible use cases in the future. With the current design
of the PolicyReducer, new rules can be easily added to the current algorithm.
10.4 Move from SEFFs to Instances
With the current approach, the policies which are derived from the usage model are being
applied to the SEFFs of components in the repository model. The problem with this is that if
a component is instantiated multiple times at dierent places in the assembly model, all of
the policies aecting these AssemblyContexts will be mapped to the same BasicComponent
in the repository model. Therefore, no dierentiation between the instances is possible
anymore in the context model. This can lead to errors for misconguration being thrown
even though the usage diagram and the misusage diagram would aect dierent Assembly-
Contexts and therefore would not cause an error. On the other hand, possible combinations
of policies on one SEFFs might lead to the accidental allowance of unwanted contexts since
the combined context sets actually aect dierent elements. For the evaluation of this
thesis this was not a problem since it was possible to create duplicated components in the
repository model if it was needed. For a real use of this approach this workaround cannot












Figure 10.3: Possible context model change
Figure 10.3 shows the changes made in the context model for it to handle this feature.
Instead of the PolicySpecication being applied to a SEFF in has a AssemblyContext as a
reference and the aected method. This functionality was not implemented in this thesis
since the realization of this problem came during the later stage of the development. A
change in one of the basic functionalities could have had possible major impacts which
might have not been feasible to x in the given time frame. To implement this in future
work the algorithm nding the aected data elements needs to be adapted from SEFF to
the AssemblyContext and the according signature and interface.
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In this thesis we introduced an approach for the automatic generation of policies on the
data element level by deriving context specications from the usage description of the
system. This approach combines the idea of generating policies from existing artifacts
with the context based access control which is a model driven security approach. The goal
was to analyze if this approach can lead to an eort reduction in the creation of access
policies while simultaneously deriving a correct model without violating the fundamentals
of access control systems.
In the main part we described the two parts of the approach. The deriving of policies
from usage and misusage diagrams depends on the PCM models. The calls to the system’s
interfaces are the entry point from which all aected data elements have to be found. For
our approach, these data elements are SEFFs. The second functionality is the application of
dened rules on the resulting context model. Here, the dierent rules are introduced and
the concepts behind them are explained. For both parts, the implementations is briey
explained with the help of pseudo code.
In the evaluation we used four case studies to analyze the three goals we dened for our
approach. We showed that the derivation of the policies, as well as the reduction and the
combination of them can be achieved with great accuracy. The case studies also indicate
that with the new approach an eort reduction can be achieved. The measurement of
this metric was done with some assumptions and an experiment might need to be done
in further work to conrm the assumed eort reduction. Additionally, a performance
analysis was carried out to see the impact of dierent model parameters on the runtime.
Since the two parts of the approach, the derivation of policies from usage and misusage
diagrams, and the combination of context sets according to the dened rule set, have been
implemented as separate stand-alone plugins with clear interfaces we are condent that
they can be used in future work.
In summary, we introduced an approach which allows the automatic generation of
access policies based on the context information assigned to usage diagrams. Additionally,
the approach can detect possible security aws in the development of secure systems
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